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ABSTRACT
Measuring Relationships or Measuring Individuals:
An Ontological Analysis of Marital
Therapy Outcome Measures

Joseph A. Ostenson
Department of Psychology
Doctor of Philosophy

Many scholars have noted the pervasiveness of individualism in American culture,
particularly in the marriage culture. Unfortunately, assuming individualism in the marriage
culture poses very specific threats to marriage as an institution. Some claim that these
individualistic assumptions have also infiltrated the marital sciences, undermining the efforts of
researchers who hope to defend marriage. This dissertation explores that claim by analyzing
seven of the most popular marital outcome instruments used by marital researchers today for
individualistic assumptions.
Using a conceptual analysis called “contrasting relations,” the meanings of both the
content and the process of the instruments are laid out according to their underlying ontological
assumptions. Two types of ontology guide the analysis: weak relationality, that from which
individualism arises, and strong relationality. As the results demonstrate, the instruments are in
fact almost entirely underlain with individualistic assumptions. It is argued that outcome
instruments used by marital researchers can only measure individualistic relationships (weak
relationality), and are incapable of measuring strong relationships, implying that marital
researchers are ill-equipped to measure relationships. Implications and future directions are
explored.
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INTRODUCTION
In a ground-breaking study, sociologists Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton
(1996) argued that individualism is a dominant cultural theme in America. Individualism is the
idea that a person’s autonomy and independence take precedence over the needs or demands of
the collective group of which he or she is a part (Scranton, 1982). Bellah et al (1996) describe
many of the ways in which this idea has come to dominate how Americans view life. For
example, they discuss how individuals setting out on their own for the first time are expected to
be self-reliant, depending primarily on themselves and not on their parents or their community.
They further describe where individualism has come to pervade many of our cultural conceptions,
including not only our personal life, but also our civic and religious lives, and they worry that its
pervasiveness is negatively affecting how we as Americans are choosing to live.
Fowers (2000) is one who maintains that individualism has even penetrated our
understanding of seemingly non-individualistic issues such as the nature of marriage. Marriage is
typically seen as a partnership, but Fowers contends that cultural expectations for marriage are
often individualistic. That is, the partnership of marriage is often expected to fulfill
individualistic ends. Unfortunately, as Richardson, Fowers and Guignon (1999) warn, the more
we see marriage in this individualistic way, “the more likely we are to divorce if [marriage] is
not conducive to our well-being” (p. 161). Indeed, Fowers (2000) worries that the high divorce
rate in America today may actually be due to our individualistic conceptions of marriage.
Fowers is also concerned about married couples who seek help from professionals,
worried that they might not get the help they need. As he puts it, “we may well look to
professionals, such as marital therapists or social scientists, for a less problematic alternative [to
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individualism]” (p. 77), but he fears that “social scientific research on marriage cannot help us
resolve the marital difficulties that grow out of” individualism because “social scientists fail to
question [it]” (p. 97-98). Richardson et al (1999) express a similar concern that the failure of
social scientists to question individualism “may very well heighten the already excessive popular
[individualistic] expectations of marriage, thereby inadvertently helping to maintain or accelerate
the rate of divorce” (p. 166). Compounding this concern is their contention that many
professionals harbor these individualist conceptions without even knowing or examining them.
Individualism and Marriage: From Culture to Science
Individualism
Understanding what individualism is and how it plays out in the marriage culture can
better illuminate the problems that Richardson, Fowers and others are concerned about.
Individualism has been generally defined as the assumption that the “primary human reality is
the individual, conceived independently of social relationships” (Sullivan, 1982, p. 19). Alexis
de Tocqueville (2000) argued that individualism “disposes each member of the community to
sever himself from the mass of his fellows” (p. 104f). Those who assume individualism claim
that the individual’s autonomy takes precedence over the individual’s social obligations or
responsibilities. For Bellah et al (1996), this means that “society is a second-order, derived or
artificial construct” and is meant primarily to advance the interests of the individual (p. 334).
Individualism has “marched inexorably” through the history of America (p. xlii), permeating
politics (e.g., Sullivan, 1982), education (e.g., Watt, 1989), the civic and religious life of
American citizens (Bellah et al, 1996), and, notably, psychotherapy (e.g., Richardson, 2005;
Frank, 1978), and has fast become a ubiquitous cultural force.
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Bellah et al (1996) distinguish between two different types of individualism, and their
distinction helps inform the discussion below of how individualism manifests itself in the
marriage culture today. The first type of individualism is called utilitarian individualism, which
Bellah et al say “takes as given certain basic human appetites and fears…and sees human life as
an effort by individuals to maximize their self-interest relative to these given ends” (p. 336). For
those assuming utilitarian individualism, life is a series of “rational and strategic” actions meant
to manipulate circumstances in such a way as to achieve maximum fulfillment (Fowers &
Richardson, 1996, p. 125). From this instrumental perspective, the individual’s autonomy pits the
individual against the world outside the self. Social relationships are seen as merely contracts
into which individuals enter as a means of achieving fulfillment for the autonomous self.
The second type of individualism is called expressive individualism, which, as Fowers
and Richardson (1996) point out, is “partly a reaction to the seeming harshness of the
contractualism and calculation of utilitarian individualism” (p. 125). Bellah et al (1996) say of
expressive individualism that “each person has a unique core of feeling…that should unfold or
be expressed [in order to realize] individuality” (p. 334). They go on to say that, while this core
is unique to the individual, it is “not necessarily alien to others” and it is possible for persons to
“merge” with one another through sharing emotional cores. In other words, though expressive
individualism still holds that the individual is autonomous, relationships do not have to be
harshly instrumental. Rather, two people can hypothetically realize individuality together, as
long as a mutual understanding of emotional core exists. The harsh contractuality of
utilitarianism is replaced by mutual emotional understanding intended to enable the individual’s
full emotional, psychological, and intellectual expression.
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While expressive individualism was meant in some ways to oppose utilitarian
individualism, both forms are grounded in and emphasize the autonomy of the individual. And
while they do so in different ways, both forms also identify the individual’s ultimate aim in life
as some sort of self-fulfillment: instrumental manipulation for the utilitarian; and the sharing of a
common emotional core for the expressive. As argued in what follows, both forms of
individualism are manifest in the culture of marriage today, and both can have negative
consequences for marriage.
Individualism and the Marriage Culture
One important indication that individualism has infiltrated the marriage culture is the
historical and social evolution of how marital obligations and commitments have been viewed.
Though I argue here that marriage is mainly viewed as an individualistic pursuit today,
historically it was seen as primarily a social institution in which commitment and obligation to
the larger society or extended family group were at one time marital ideals (Popenoe, 1993).
When two people married, they were expected to fill societal obligations such as
“procreation…and the socialization of children; the provision to its [the family’s] members of
care, affection, and companionship; [and] economic cooperation” (p. 529). These were roles that
the unmarried could not fulfill, so it was the responsibility of married couples to do so. In this
way, marriage was an essential part of sustaining local political and social life (Mintz & Kellogg,
1988). Married couples were traditionally committing to fulfill certain societal obligations and,
as such, were committed to one another and marriage was seen primarily in terms of
commitment and obligation, not romantic attachment, love, or personal fulfillment.
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But as individualism has become more and more culturally pervasive, marriage has
increasingly become understood in a very different light (Aldous, 1987). Where a “good
marriage” used to be one that fulfilled the obligations and commitments associated with social
cohesion, a “good marriage” today is many times seen as one that encourages “self-fulfillment
and personal growth” (Hill, 2007, p. 298). Marriage is now primarily more often seen, not as an
expression of one’s obligation to others, but rather as an expression of one’s individuality.
Indeed, it is seen by many as a rather important – perhaps necessary – way of expressing
individuality. Popenoe (1993) argues that “[o]ne’s own self-fulfillment is seen to require a
significant other, and marital partners are picked primarily to be personal companions” (p. 533,
emphasis added). In other words, people continue to enter marriage by way of commitment to
another person, but those commitments are no longer meant to enhance the community, or even
the marriage itself. They are intended to enhance the individuals in the marriage. For many
today, the marital commitment has become in essence a means to expressing individuality and
thus, is individualistic.
Another indication that marriage is often conceptualized as individualistic is the
importance of communication when marriages are troubled (Knapp & Gantt, in press). For
several years now, communication has been seen as “central to the conventional concept of the
good marriage” and essential for marriage to succeed (Fowers, 2000, p. 78). Where marriage is
seen as an expression of individuality, it should come as no surprise that communication would
be important. Two unique individuals attempting to express their own individualities are almost
inevitably going to find differences in their emotional cores. Where emotional cores differ,
communication of the differences, wherein each individual expresses his or her personal
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emotional core, is perhaps the only way to ensure the merging of emotional cores necessary for
each individual to fully express his or her individuality. Thus the emphasis on marital
communication is also individualistic, as its purpose is not to fulfill obligations or commitments,
but to express individuality and to achieve self-fulfillment through marriage (Richardson, Fowers,
& Guignon, 1999).
While expressive individualism is a large part of how marriage is understood today, some
argue it is not the best way to conceptualize marriage. From this perspective, interpersonal
obligation and commitment are secondary to personal fulfillment. Ultimately, Bellah et al (1996)
argue, expressive individualism “denies all forms of obligation and commitment in relationships,
replacing them only with the ideal of full, open, honest communication among self-actualized
individuals” (p. 101). When conceptualized in this manner, marriage is merely a means to
individuation and self-fulfillment. The consequence of seeing marriage as this type of a means is
that marriage becomes more fragile, as marriages cannot always live up to these individualistic
expectations (Fowers, 2000). Self-fulfillment is the goal, and marriage is just a means to
achieving that goal. If a marriage is no longer meeting the needs of the individual, then one must
seek self-fulfillment elsewhere.
Fowers also argues that seeing self-fulfillment as the goal of marriage strips marriage of
its broader context, leaving it barren of any larger meanings, such as virtues that Fowers suggests
ought to be characteristic of a marriage; virtues that are at least as important as – if not more
important than – self-fulfillment. As a consequence of this radical reduction of marriage, even
divorce is coming to be “seen as a path to individual freedom and greater personal fulfillment” (p.
71). Thus, rather than focusing on a broader context of marriage, couples maintain marriage only
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to express one’s individuality, and thus are more willing to divorce if that is the most effective
means of fulfilling the self.
Expressive individualism and utilitarian individualism were meant to oppose one another.
However, the manner in which marriage is frequently conceptualized today accommodates both
types of individualism rather well. Not only is marriage meant to express individuality, but as
Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999) note, the “good marriage” is often characterized by the
good feelings that marriage brings to each individual. They argue that couples seeking the good
feelings a marriage brings often “remain committed to each other out of desire, not obligation” (p.
159) and that “modern ideology…tends to emphasize voluntary participation in families
contingent on emotional fulfillment, individual satisfaction, and compatibility with other
individual pursuits” (p. 78, emphasis added). That is, participation in marriage is primarily a way
to maximize personal fulfillment. And where personal fulfillment is not maximized, couples
should then “be able to alter or terminate their commitments as they see fit” (p. 162-3). This
“rational and strategic” approach to marrying and divorcing is the most prominent way in which
utilitarian individualism manifests itself today: because marriage is so often seen as merely a
means to good feelings and self-fulfillment, it is also seen as terminable when those good
feelings end.
In this sense, marriage today is frequently subject to both expressive and utilitarian
individualism and, as many are arguing, is threatened as a consequence. That is not to say that
individualistically based marriages will automatically fail, or that non-individualist marriages are
impossible. In spite of how fragile marriage is today, it is still as popular as it ever was, valued
“as a prime source of happiness in life” (Richardson, Fowers and Guignon, 1999, p. 77). And
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certainly, where happiness is felt in marriage, it may continue for a time. Still, as the traditional
wedding vows imply, marriages will likely encounter sickness as well as health, and poverty as
well as wealth. These events can be deeply problematic when the first priority from this
individualistic perspective is not the relationship but the individual. For those who see marriage
in this highly individualistic way, marriage is seen mainly as a disposable instrument, one that
should be engaged in only when it serves its purpose of fulfilling the individual (or bringing
“happiness”). It is not difficult to see that conceptualizing marriage this way might lead “to more
fragile, less committed relationships” (p. 77); relationships that are almost bound to fail where
self-fulfillment is impossible. It is also easier to understand why Fowers (2000) attributes the
high divorce rate in America today to the growing influence of individualism.
In opposition to this focus on the individual, Fowers and others (e.g., Richardson, Fowers,
& Guignon, 1999) argue that marriage is as much about betweenness. In other words, human
relationships – in particular, marriage – imply much more than just the individual needs or
desires of the couple. One example would be the virtues Fowers (2000) writes about. I will
discuss more in depth this alternative approach, and in particular how it contrasts with
individualism, in the following chapter. For now, it is important to point out that individualism is
only one way to view marriage – and according to many, a rather poor way of doing so.
Individualism and Marital Science
As marriage has become weaker in the United States, the social sciences have tried
diligently to address this weakness. Divorce brings with it a number of social problems, such as
financial (Lupton & Smith, 2003), health (Lillard & Waite, 1995), and psychological for the
divorced (Marks & Lambert, 1998) and their children (Ge, Natsuaki, & Conger, 2006; Pryor &

9

Rodgers, 2001). In response, therapy has been geared specifically for married couples since the
1940s (Nichols, 1992) and extensive research has been conducted, all in hopes of combating the
ills associated with troubled marriages and divorce.
Married couples often turn to the marital sciences when their marriages are troubled in
hopes of finding relief. But with the pervasiveness of individualistic assumptions in American
culture, one questions whether the marital sciences have found truly alternative assumptions
upon which to build their science. The answer to this question will likely prove consequential: if
selfishness or pride is at the foundation of a married couple’s problems, then advice founded on
individualism will likely not help much; indeed, it may make matters worse. Even if selfishness
is not at the heart of a couple’s problems, it seems risky to encourage individualism – whether in
therapy or through research findings – for any married couple. Thus it does not seem
unreasonable to ask whether and to what extent individualism infects the marital sciences.
Some argue that the marital sciences have avoided the pitfalls of individualism. This
should come as no surprise, given the ostensible emphasis on relationships in the marital
sciences. Doherty and Boss (1991) are among those who assert that marital therapy “has
transcended the narrow focus on the individual” that one finds in traditional psychotherapy (p.
613). They acknowledge the pervasiveness of individualism in American culture – even in
psychology – but assure readers that the family sciences as a whole generally avoid the more
extreme forms of individualism. Stahmann (2002), for example, points out that marital therapists
and scientists have for years been aware of the threats that individualism poses to married
couples, and proper training is in place that can help the scientist or practitioner avoid
individualism in their work. Doherty (2002) agrees, admitting that many marital therapists are
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likely promoting individualistic values in therapy, but do so only because of improper training or
no training at all. He expresses confidence in the marital sciences to right what bad therapists
(those with individualistic values) do wrong, and argues that by drawing upon resources already
available in the marital sciences, therapists can begin to avoid the threats posed by individualism
in the marital sciences.
On the other hand, there are also those who argue that, in spite of efforts to avoid
individualism, it can be found at the very foundation of the marital sciences (Milardo & Wellman,
1992). For example, Fowers (2000) fears that the consumerism associated with marital therapy
leads therapists to give the customer (the client) exactly what he or she wants – which in today’s
culture, generally translates into warrant to pursue individualistic ends. Thus therapists, as
service providers in a capitalistic system, are driven by the consumer to endorse individualistic
values because the client desires those values. And the social scientific study of marriage fares
no better, according to Fowers. He argues that “there is a great deal of overlap between research
on marriage and the common wisdom about it” (p. 96). In other words, the common wisdom of
marriage – that it should be personally fulfilling above all – spills over into marital research.
Richardson, Fowers and Guignon (1999) point out that marital happiness is “the most frequently
studied topic by marital and family researchers,” indicating that researchers are interested in
finding what most Americans are interested in finding – happier marriages (p. 164). They go on
to argue that the “standard scientific and therapeutic approaches to the dilemmas of
contemporary marriage [such as individualism] have considerable potential for reinforcing these
dilemmas rather than resolving them” (p. 169). In other words, Richardson, Fowers & Guignon
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worry not only that the marital sciences do not avoid individualism, but that they endorse and
encourage individualism among married couples and in the culture at large.
These two conflicting views – on the one hand, that the marital sciences transcend
individualism; on the other, that the marital sciences encourage individualism – leave one
wondering which view is empirically correct. The answer to this question matters immensely: if
turning to the marital sciences will help couples avoid individualistic tendencies, then the tide of
individualism can be somewhat stemmed by marital therapy and research. However, if the
marital sciences are reinforcing individualism, we should recognize this potentially deleterious
reinforcement and consider what direction marital science ought to take instead.
Theory, Practice, and Methods. The purpose of this dissertation is to determine if and to
what extent individualistic assumptions drive marital research. In particular, my purpose will be
to analyze marital therapy outcome measures. As we will see below, doing so is necessary to get
a whole picture of the marital sciences, since this analysis will add to what has already been
argued about the level of relationality in the marital sciences. In what follows, I will show that
both the theory and practice of marital scientists have been analyzed to some degree and have
been shown to make individualistic assumptions. No such analysis has been done, however, on
the research methods of marital scientists, which I will argue will help provide a whole picture of
the marital sciences.
Richardson, Fowers and Guignon (1999) are among those who have looked at theory in
the marital sciences and pointed out the underlying individualism. They argue that the theories
often focus on individual marital satisfaction. That is, marital quality is nearly always defined in
some way or another by the personal satisfaction of married individuals (see also Fowers, 1998;
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Bishop, 2007). Richardson, Fowers and Guignon (1999) argue that this perspective on marriage
grows out of the individualistic understanding of the “good marriage” that has arisen culturally.
As Fowers (2000) puts it, “[we] like to think of scientists as objective observers…[but from] the
very beginning of research on marriage, social scientists have simply assumed that personal
experiences such as happiness, satisfaction, or adjustment define a good marriage” (p. 89-90,
emphasis in original). In other words, those theorizing about the “good marriage” have not
obtained their own goal of being objective, as they have relied upon individualistic assumptions
in their theorizing.
Fowers and Richardson (1996) have also looked at the practices within the marital
sciences and have argued that marital therapy has also been unable to avoid individualistic
assumptions (an argument also shared by Bellah et al, 1996). For the most part, therapists have
simply adopted the same assumptions made by their clientele, which tend to fall right in line with
the individualistic assumptions of most Americans (Fowers, 2000). What is worse, argues
Fowers, is that therapists are unaware of the assumptions they adopt, but do so out of a desire to
give the client what they want. Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon (1999) have pointed out that this
“unquestioned acceptance” by marital therapists of individualistic assumptions threatens to
promote the same assumptions among married couples that caused their problems in the first
place.
While analysis of theory and practice are currently being pursued, the methods used by
these same scientists have been for the most part ignored. Theory and practice are seldom hidden
from public view and therefore get much of the attention when it comes to criticism of the
marital sciences, with good cause. After all, what is most apparent seems to also make the most
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impact, so it deserves as much attention as it can get. However, a complete view of whether the
marital sciences are individualistic, or weakly relational, cannot exist without an investigation of
the methods used by marital scientists. Indeed, ignoring the methods may be ignoring the most
important part of the marital sciences.
First of all, outcome measures are the predominant measures that have been used
pervasively since the beginning of the marital sciences. Initially, they were used to help
distinguish marital therapy from individual therapy (Fredman & Sherman, 1987). Before marital
therapy, those whose troubled marriages led them to therapists had to rely on individual
therapeutic models (which models have also been implicated as being individualistic; see, for
example, Cushman, 1995). As marital therapy developed, it was meant to be more effective than
individual therapy at treating couples (Sprenkle & Moon, 1996). Special measures were
developed to determine the effectiveness of marital therapy. Thus early on, outcome measures
were used to distinguish marital science from other social sciences, and in this way were also
used to help validate its scientific reputation.
Indeed, outcome measures are still used today as a means of lending scientific credence
to the discipline. For example, there is a big push today for evidence based practice (EBP) in the
marital sciences (Carr, 2000). The “evidence” for EBPs draws heavily on the marital therapy
outcome measures, making the role of outcome measures significant in establishing scientific
credibility for marital research (cf. Sholevar & Schwoeri, 2003; Johnson, 2002). Outcome
measures have also been used for roles such as “gathering information and making
diagnoses…[aiding] the working therapist, [enlightening] the student, and [providing] reliable
and valid measurements for researchers,” as well as helping to establish the marital sciences as a
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discipline worthy of government and private financial support (Fredman & Sherman, 1987, p.
xv). Thus we see that outcome measures are used ubiquitously by the theorists being criticized
by Richardson, Fowers, and others.
Not only are marital theorists using outcome measures ubiquitously, but outcome
measures also play a big role in the practice of marital therapy. For example, therapists are also
relying on EBPs, primarily to determine which of the numerous approaches to marital therapy
are best (Carr, 2000). As I mention above, the evidence used to build the case for EBPs comes
from the outcome measures. Thus marital therapy outcome measures determine for some
therapists which techniques to use. Like theorists, therapists are depending on marital therapy
outcome measures to help determine the credibility of their practice. Indeed, as the EBP
movement grows, theorists and therapists both will come to depend upon marital therapy
outcome measures. If the measures are underlain with individualistic assumptions, then the
influence of individualism will continue to spread to both theory and practice in the marital
sciences and the call to EBP will unintentionally become the purveyor of an individualistic
approach to treatment.
Finally, outcome measures are also being used both at the beginning and the end of
therapy to determine the status of a couple’s relationship previous to and after therapeutic
intervention (Fredman & Sherman, 1987). Couples coming into therapy are generally understood
to have “bad marriages;” outcome measures are meant to reveal that. Then of course, therapists
will use the measures to judge whether or not the relationship has improved, in which case, they
are used to determine whether a “bad marriage” was successfully made into a “good marriage”
as a consequence of therapy (Johnson, 2002). Implicitly, then, outcome measures define the
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“good marriage” from a therapeutic perspective. Thus, even while the definition of a “good
marriage” likely varies from therapist to therapist, one significant way of defining the “good
marriage” – at least within the literature – can be found through an analysis of the marital
therapy outcome measures.
Dissertation Outline
Given that marital therapy outcome measures are a significant part of the marital sciences,
both as a foundation of marital research and as an implicit definer of effective therapy and the
“good marriage,” they need to be examined in order to determine if and how deep individualism
runs in the marital sciences. Understanding how pervasive individualism is in the marital
sciences is essential in understanding how effective the marital sciences conducted within such
philosophical boundaries truly can be. Scholars have argued that, to some extent the theories and
practices of marital scientists have difficulty avoiding individualism, but no one has yet looked at
the methods used by marital researchers. Thus, we do not know as yet whether we are truly
measuring relationships, or if we are simply measuring individuals. Therefore, I have done an
analysis of the marital therapy outcome measures to determine whether individualism is as
pervasive as it seems to be in the theory and practice of marital research.
For this particular project, I have used an ontological analysis to uncover the assumptions
inherit to the measures of marital therapy outcome. In Chapter 2, I communicate why an
ontological analysis is the best way to analyze the measures for individualism. I also describe
two ontologies which will guide the analysis and devote the bulk of the chapter to defining the
ontologies and describing what marriage would look like from both ontologies. This chapter will
serve as a foundation for the remainder of the dissertation.

16

Chapter 3 is devoted to a literature review which has guided my choice of measures to
analyze. I briefly describe the type of measure I will analyze, then present the literature review
itself, describing the process that led to the inclusion of the analyzed measures. At the conclusion
of Chapter 3, I list and describe these measures.
In Chapter 4, I present the results of the analysis. I begin this chapter by describing the
method, which I call contrasting relations. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a narration
of the analysis, wherein I present my findings. The analysis was split up into two parts, the first
of which deals with the content of the measures and the second with process.
In Chapter 5, I conclude with a summary of the analysis, including the limitations and
implications, which include recommendations for future research.
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INDIVIDUALISM AND ONTOLOGY
Determining how pervasive individualism is in the marital sciences is more difficult than
it might seem. While scholars are fond of pointing out the individualistic assumptions being
made in the marriage culture, it is rare for scholars to accuse marital scientists of making those
same assumptions. This is likely due to the fact that the martial sciences study marriages – a
particular type of relationship – and so seem ostensibly to be relational. A casual consumer of the
marital sciences might simply assume that because of this ostensible relationality, the marital
sciences successfully avoid individualism. Indeed, it would seem that individualism and
relationality could not coexist, therefore the answer to whether researchers assume individualism
is clear. Unfortunately, as I argue here, the answer is not so clear. My purpose in this chapter is
to facilitate an answer to this question by distinguishing individualism and its corresponding
relationality from an alternative form of relationality. Through this distinction, I show that a
deeper analysis of the methods is therefore necessary.
I begin by discussing various features of individualism. From this discussion, we will see
that individualism represents a set of assumptions about people that can negatively affect
marriages. I will then argue that this set of assumptions can be unified by a particular ontology,
namely abstractionism, and that individualism itself is underlain with an abstractionist ontology.
In describing this ontology, I will demonstrate that in fact, a certain kind of relationality is
possible from abstractionism, and is thus individualistic. But this relationality, as I will show, is
problematic for marriage because of its relationship to individualism. In this way, I argue that
individualism can coexist with at least one form of relationality.
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I will also introduce an alternative ontology as a contrast to abstractionism. From this
alternative ontology an alternative relationality arises – one which is fundamentally different
from individualism and one that might be amenable to addressing the problems of individualism
for marriage. I will show by this discussion of contrasting ontologies that at least two differing
types of relationality are available for theorists at the ontological level and that, consequently,
determining whether individualism is being assumed in the methods of marital science is a
matter of determining which relationality is assumed by the methods. In other words, as I will
describe, the problem I am faced with in my analysis of the marital therapy outcome measures
can be resolved at the level of ontology. A fuller explication of the implications of each ontology
for marriage will refine my discussion of ontology, as well as provide a framework upon which
my analysis of methods can be based.
Individualism as an Ontological Question
As individualism has risen in American culture, scholars have pointed out different ways
in which it has manifested itself. And as we will see, each of these different features has been
identified as a threat to marriage. The first feature is atomism, which is the idea that individuals
are fundamentally self-contained (Reber & Osbeck, 2005). This particular feature arises out of
the idea that the identity of an individual is fundamentally autonomous, which is also to say that
an individual’s identity is also fundamentally independent of others’ identities. Assuming
atomism places limitations upon the type of relationality that is possible. For example,
relationships (such as marriage) cannot be a fundamental part of an individual’s identity, for that
would require one’s identity to be dependent upon that relationship. Instead, the individual must
begin and end as a self-contained entity, and understanding “whether and how [a] relationship is
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maintained” will focus on the self-contained qualities of an individual, such as his or her
“thoughts, feelings, and behaviors” (p. 65). Few critics of individualism in marriage have
focused on this particular feature of individualism (e.g., Williams & Faulconer, 2008;
Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999); nevertheless it is an important feature which helps us
understand individualism and its other features.
The self-contained nature of an individual enables the individual to divide his or her own
interests from the interest of others, making a second feature of individualism possible: selfinterest. Self-interest is likely one of the most oft discussed and criticized features of
individualism to marriage (e.g., Aldous, 1987; Doherty, 2002; Beach, Fincham, & Stanley, 2007;
Amato, Booth, Johnson, & Rogers, 2007). Often when scholars talk about the threat of
individualism to marriage, they are talking about an individualism that “ranks self-interest and
self-preference as the highest priorities” in marriage (Porter, 1995, p. 14). That is, self-interest
ranks higher than other-interest or interest in the relationship. This sort of “look out for myself”
attitude can be potentially very damaging to marriage. After all, one who is only interested in
herself is not likely interested in marriage and, if married, not likely to remain so unless her
interests are consistently being met. Fortunately, the type of radical self-interest that would
prevent people from marrying does not seem too pervasive, given that people still marry, and to
assume individualism does not necessarily mean to assume a radical self-interest. However, selfinterest is still an important feature of individualism that, like atomism, continues to make its
appearance along with the other features of individualism.
Indeed, self-interest and atomism both figure prominently in instrumentalism, another
feature of individualism. Instrumentalism is the idea that relationships can be objectified (and
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essentially, atomized) and used as instruments in serving the self (Richardson, 2005). This
particular feature of individualism shows up particularly at the intersection of marriage and
individualism in American culture. As Bellah et al (1996) point out, individualism is rampant in
our culture. And yet, Americans also marry at one of the highest rates in the world (Waite &
Gallagher, 2000; Warren, 1992). The fact that marriage and individualism are both pervasive
phenomena can leave one wondering whether they are truly at odds with one another. But
Fowers (2000) claims that instead, marriage is often seen instrumentally, or as an instrument
toward fulfilling individualistic ends. In other words, the main reason marriage is so highly
valued in culture is not for its own sake, but rather for the emotional benefits that can be derived
from marriage for the individual. Fowers also argues that the divorce rate in America bears this
instrumental attitude out: because marriage often fails to meet our personal expectations, divorce
enables us to look for personal fulfillment in a different marriage (see also Cherlin, 2009).
Through this separation of the means (marriage) and the end (self-fulfillment), we have turned
marriage into a thing-like object, independent of the self that either impedes or assists the self in
obtaining fulfillment.
Instrumentalism is closely related to utilitarian individualism – discussed earlier – and its
negative effects on marriage should be obvious. Marriages can only be successful “to the extent
that they meet each partner’s innermost psychological needs” (Amato, Booth, Johnson, & Rogers,
2007). When those needs are no longer met, then divorce tends to become the instrument that
meets the self’s needs. And in a culture such as ours, where “individual feelings [are] central to
knowing which aims to pursue and in guiding the assessment of goal attainment,” marriage can
only thrive when it serves its instrumental purpose (Fowers & Richardson, 1996, p. 126). As I
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mentioned previously, the harshness of this utilitarian perspective – particularly in relationships
such as marriage – is one of the primary reasons expressive individualism arose (Bellah et al.,
1996). Yet while this form of individualism does differ in important ways from utilitarian
individualism, it does not entirely avoid instrumentalism. For the expressive individualist, the
“end” is to express one’s individuality, and marriage for many has become a means to that end
(see Hill, 2007). Often, when one marries and who one marries – and even how one chooses to be
married – are often viewed as ways of expressing oneself. Even from this expressive perspective,
the individual takes precedence over the marriage and the marriage serves as an instrument to
self-expression.
These differing features of individualism – atomism, self-interest, and instrumentalism –
not only demonstrate different facets of individualism; each also deals with some sort of
abstracting. Atomism assumes that the nature of an individual is best understood when it is
abstracted from other individuals, since one’s nature is fundamentally self-contained. Likewise,
self-interest is by definition the abstraction of one’s interest from the interest of others.
Instrumentalism abstracts the means from the end, such that any (abstracted) object (such as
marriage) that becomes a means cannot also be the end. Indeed, to assume instrumentalism one
also abstracts individuals from the objects which serve the individual’s well-being, such as
relationships. And finally, individualism itself is an abstraction of one individual from other
individuals, assuming their fundamental autonomy from one the other.
The fact that each of these features deals with some sort of abstraction alludes to the fact
that each assumption is also derived from the same view of fundamental reality. Assuming
individualism, as well as its other features, places limitations on what can or cannot be assumed
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about the nature of things, particularly individuals. For example, to assume individualism is both
to assume that individuals are fundamentally autonomous and to assume the individuals do not
have a shared nature. One does not assume, for instance, that individuals are both autonomous
and not autonomous simultaneously, so assuming individualism leaves one with a specific
allusion to how things really are. The reality which unites the features of individuals seems to be
a reality of abstractions; that is, a reality where abstractions are considered fundamentally real.
The branch of philosophy which deals with the nature of reality is called ontology (Borchert,
2005) and the specific ontology in which abstractions are considered fundamental has been
called an abstractionist ontology, or abstractionism (Slife, 2005). As we will see below,
individualism and its features all fall under the blanket of abstractionism. Thus each feature of
individualism can be derived from an abstractionist ontology. We will further see that there is a
particular relationality that is derived from abstractionism, a relationality that is fundamentally
no different than individualism and its features.
Abstractionism
An abstractionist ontology essentially takes abstractions to be fundamentally real, and all
persons, places, or things are best understood as abstracted from one another, or removed from
their context (Slife, 2005). Context refers to the particulars of the person, place, or object, such
as its immediate surroundings or its history. Consider a hammer. From an abstractionist
perspective, a hammer is best understood as an object in and of itself, removed from its context
of tool box, work bench, user, or history of function, and is thought to have certain properties
which do not change even when the context changes. In other words, a hammer is a hammer,
whether it is being used to pound nails or to keep papers from flying away. It retains properties

23

which define it as a hammer in spite of the context. Thus it is, fundamentally, autonomous and
independent of its context.
The abstractionist would also view persons as abstractions. That is, a person is “defined
in abstraction from any constitutive concerns and hence from any [contextual] identity” (Taylor,
1989, p. 49). Consequently, the individual possesses certain properties or characteristics that
contexts do not essentially change. One example of how this plays out is the use of laboratories
in the social sciences: removing individuals from their context to the lab is viewed as a way to
strip the context (e.g., remove “confounding” or changeable factors) and get at what is
fundamental about those they are studying. Because of its fundamental, unchangeable
characteristics, that knowledge can then be transferred to the world outside the lab. While the
abstractionist will not deny that there are changeable aspects of the individual, change (or what
changes) is not fundamental to a true understanding of the individual. Thus the individual is
fundamentally “buffered” from the outside influences of context, including his or her
relationships to other individuals (Taylor, 2007). Here we see the foundation of atomistic
assumptions. Individuals “begin and end as [unchangeable], self-contained individualities” (Slife,
2005, p. 158) and what is real—whether it concerns an individual or a relationship—requires an
understanding of the self-contained, and thus abstracted, properties of individuals.
Abstractionism and Relationships
But just because individuals are self-contained does not mean that individuals cannot be
in relationships. The nature of these relationships, however, must necessarily follow from the
ontological assumptions which characterize abstractionism. First of all, note that abstractions are
essentially unified similarities. Consider the abstract definition of “cat.” Suppose we define cats
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as “four-legged, furry mammals that purr.” Our “abstraction” has included those things which all
particular cats share (i.e., their four legs, mammalian status, and the fact that they purr). It has
also excluded traits which cats tend not to share (e.g., color, size, etc.). The relationships between
all cats are characterized from an abstractionist perspective by the shared similarities; that is how
the abstract “cat” is defined.
In like manner the abstractionist defines human relationships based on what is similar,
not what is different. From this perspective, abstractions are fundamental and thus relationships
are not fundamental to reality; they must be created. In other words, relationships are secondary
creations of abstracted individuals. And consistent with an abstractionist ontology, the
relationships are both created and maintained by individuals through common abstractions –
through similarities (Slife, 2005). That is, relationships are built when two abstracted individuals
find commonalities by which they can be united. These commonalities serve as “contact points”
for the self-contained individualities and serve as the foundation of any relationship. After all, if
individuals are self-contained, each can only know the other insofar as the two are similar. And
without the commonalities, there are no contact points between the two differing, self-contained
individuals. Thus where commonalities do not exist, individuals wishing to create a relationship
are left with two options: either one persuades the other, so that agreement is ultimately
established, or the two choose to “tolerate” one another’s difference – that is, they agree to
disagree. For the abstractionist, agreement is essential for creating and maintaining a relationship.
But even when relationships are created, they still do not represent a fundamental reality.
Relationships are “what is ‘out there’” and must move from the self-contained individual to the
world outside of the individual (Buber, 2000, p. 93). It is still possible for the relationship to
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affect the individuals in relation, but only when what is “outside” the individual is brought to the
inside of the self and becomes a property of the self-contained individual (Reber & Osbeck,
2005). For instance, when information is exchanged between two people, the information affects
an individual, but only insofar as the information has been taken from the outside of the
individual and “processed” within the individual. Thus understanding a relationship from this
abstractionist perspective necessitates first and foremost an understanding of the individuals of
the relationship, or the “thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of each party, for it is assumed that
these factors ultimately determine whether and how the relationship is maintained” (p. 65).
With its focus on the autonomous individual, it is easy to see how individualism can be
derived from abstractionism. Both the abstractionist and the individualist see the individual as
primary – that is, prior to the relationship – independent and distinct from other individuals, and
the individual is best understood as self-contained, abstracted from other individuals. From both
perspectives, social relationships are secondary to the abstracted, autonomous individual. Indeed,
it is also easy to see where self-interest and instrumentalism fit well within the abstractionist
framework. Relationships, being secondary creations, are not understood to be created for the
sake of the relationship; rather they are understood to be created for the sake of the self, for they
ultimately become properties of the self anyway. It only makes sense, then, to see a relationship
as fundamentally serving one’s self interest, thus the value of a relationship depends upon what
the relationship can do for the self.
One can see the potential confusion in trying to determine the extent to which
individualism is a part of any discipline, particularly one that is ostensibly relational. Even
though individualism and its features find their roots in abstractionism, relationships can still be
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important for those assuming abstractionism. However, relationality from this ontological
perspective – with its focus on the individual – is ultimately just another form of individualism,
given their common ontological foundation. Consequently, this sort of individualistic
relationality will likely suffer from the same problems identified in Chapter 1. Thus avoiding
individualism is not as simple as just discussing relationships and relationality. It may also be the
case, however, that abstractionism offers the only form of relationality, in which case it would
not matter whether we avoid individualism or not. Knowing whether this is the case necessitates
understanding an alternative relationality – one whose ontological roots distinguish it
fundamentally from individualism and abstractionism.
An Alternative Relationality
An alternative form of relationality is already being explored in the natural and social
sciences (see Reber, 2007; Nelson, 2007; Slife, 2005; Prigogine, 1997; Prigogine & Stengers,
1984). This ontological relationality proposes that all persons and things are first and foremost in
relationship to one another. That is, persons and objects share their being with the context of
which they are a part and thus are best understood in relation to their context (Slife & Wiggins,
in press). Consider once again the example of the hammer. The ontological relationist would
claim that, because the hammer shares its being with the context, its identity can and does change
as a consequence of a changing context. Its identity is best understood in relation to its context,
as a nail-pounding hammer when it is pounding nails and a paperweight hammer when it is
weighing down papers. Likewise, the identity of persons change when their context changes. A
person is not considered independent in any way of his or her context, but rather his or her
characteristics are at least partly dependent upon the context of the person.
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Unlike the abstractionist, the unchanging is not understood as fundamental, with the
changeable as secondary. A relationist attends to both the unchanging and the changing nature of
the person as he or she navigates different contexts. The fundamental reality of any person
consists both of the person and his or her constitutive relationships, which includes the changing
and unchanging. It is true that the person may maintain similarities across contexts, but the
relationist is just as concerned with the essential differences that occur when a person changes
contexts. It is the similarities (unchanging or constant parts) and differences (those parts which
do change) which constitute the whole of, and thus make up the fundamental reality of, a person
or a relationship (Slife, 2005; Slife & Wiggins, in press). The best understanding, from this
relational perspective, is an understanding of the whole.
It is important to note that abstractions and relationships exist in both ontological
frameworks. The question from either ontology is not so much “what exists” as “what is
considered fundamental.” From an abstractionist perspective, the abstracted and unchangeable is
fundamental, and relationships are considered secondary. In other words, the abstractionist
acknowledges the existence of relationships—even values relationships—but sees the
relationships as secondary to the self-contained individuals (Reber & Osbeck, 2005). Indeed, as I
have mentioned, the abstractionist would even see relationships as internalized or a part of the
individual. For this reason, abstractionism is sometimes called a weak relationality (Slife, 2005).
On the other hand, from a relational ontology, relationships are fundamental and abstractions are
secondary. Persons are always in relationship and the relationships are crucial to understanding
the person. People cannot be understood except in relation, thus this sort of ontological
relationality is called a “strong relationality” (p. 159). It should be noted that the adjectives
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“weak” and “strong” used here are not meant to be value judgments, but are used merely to
describe the type of relationality being assumed at the ontological level. In fact, in many
philosophical contexts the “weaker” type of concept or system is often considered the more valid
or truthful.
Strong Relationality
As I have already mentioned, a strong relationality assumes that relationships are the
fundamental reality of human existence (Jackson, 2005). From this ontological perspective, even
the “idea of an isolated [individual] is self-contradictory… [for apart] from this essential relation
he does not exist” (Macmurray, 1999, p. 24). In other words, one’s identity is constituted by her
relations to others. Above, we saw that from a weak relationality, relationships must be created,
and the worth of a relationship depends on personal fulfillment. But as relationships need not be
created, and always and already exist as from a strong relationality, the focus is no longer on the
individual, but on the relationship. This means that from a strongly relational perspective, as
Slife and Wiggins (in press) point out, “relationships should be good rather than satisfying [to the
individual]” (p. 20, emphasis added). That is, the value of the relationship is determined not by
what it brings to the individual, but on whether or not it is good. Making self-interest or
instrumentalism the focus would do violence to the relationship, and it would no longer be a
“good” relationship (Buber, 2000).
Individualism versus Individuality
To summarize thus far, a strong relationality emphasizes the context of the person such
that any one person’s identity is inseparable from, and thus constituted by, her context and her
relationships to others. In this way, strong relationality avoids the atomism of individualism.

29

Rather than an “individual” in the ontologically autonomous sense, the person is seen as deeply
embedded in her unique nexus of constitutive relationships; that is, her identity – and likewise,
her uniqueness, as we see below – stems from her particular situatedness in the greater context of
human life. Ontologically, then, a strong relationality cannot allow for a self that is completely
autonomous of other selves, and does not assume atomism. Nor does strong relationality favor
self-interest, given the value of the relationship over the self. And likewise instrumentalism can
be avoided, as it is often driven by self-interest, and as means and ends are no longer separable
from each other if one is to remain true to the ontology.
Rather than assumptions of individualism, then, a strong relationality – with its focus on
relationships – assumes a very different sort of uniqueness. A person, by virtue of her agency
(ability to choose), is “always a constitutive part of [her] own [context]” (Slife & Wiggins, in
press, p. 21). That is, she always bears at least some responsibility for her contextual situation. It
is important to point out that this sort of agency is very different than what one would see from a
weak relationality. Choice, from a weak relationality, is independent of the context. Agency from
a strong relationality implies choice which is deeply contextual, and thus both enabled by and
bound by the context: enabled because one’s various choices are only made possible by the
context she is in; bound because her choices are also constrained by the context, and are
therefore never made independent of the context (e.g., one cannot choose kick a fence where no
fence is available; see Slife & Williams, 1995). As co-constituter of the context, one is uniquely
responsible for the context one is in, including the state of one’s relationships. In other words,
uniqueness comes not from one’s independence from the context, but from one’s unique
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dependence on and responsibility toward the context. Rather than individualism, then, we have
what might be called individuality – a uniqueness that is deeply contextual, deeply relational.
Marriage and Relationality
That there are two types of relationality – weak and strong – that differ so radically from
one another brings us back to the question, from which relationality are marital researchers
drawing? On the one hand, they could be avoiding individualism completely by assuming a
strong relationality. On the other, they could be doing no better than assuming individualism by
assuming a weak relationality. Given the distinctions in relationality that I have made thus far, it
seems necessary to look at the methods of marital scientists at the ontological level. But the
distinctions I have made thus far are also very thin. What remains is a thicker explication of these
two forms of relationality, particularly how each would play out in marriage. What follows is a
fuller explication of the differences between weak and strong relationality, and their various
implications, in the context of marriage. This section serves both to refine the distinctions
between abstractionism and strong relationality and to provide a framework by which the
analysis can be guided.
I have organized this section based on the features of individualism I discussed above. As
these features are the most noticed, and seemingly the most pervasive, in American culture, they
seem a good starting place for fleshing out both types of relationality in marriage. I begin each
subsection with a discussion of how each feature of weak relationality plays out in the context of
marriage, and then provide a contrasting feature grounded in a strong relationality. To provide
practical examples of each weakly relational assumption, I have drawn upon one book of Laura
Denke’s. Denke is an author who has written several books on marriage intended for lay
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audiences. Though much of what she writes fits well within a weak relationality framework, my
use of her book is by no means meant to represent a whole class of literature or a body of
researchers. It is merely used to illustrate how the various features of weak relationality play out
practically.
Atomism versus Holism
As I said previously, from a weak relationality, individuals are fundamentally selfcontained, and therefore relationships are secondary creations, built upon sameness and
similarities. This can mean a number of things about marriage. First of all, a good marriage from
this perspective is one where agreement is foundational. Disagreements might occur, but it is
important that a couple agree more than disagree. Further, agreement would be seen in the form
of abstractions, such as thoughts, feelings, and behaviors – things that are, above all, personal
(abstracted from the marriage itself). One can see this phenomenon occurring in the marriage
culture today, where good marriages can be built on similar hobbies or values. From this
perspective, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know someone who is different than you are when
you are fundamentally self-contained. Knowing begins and ends where you are similar to the one
you wish to know; it just becomes a matter of uncovering or of building those similarities. It is
not uncommon to meet a couple, married or engaged, who make their similarities the focus of
their relationship.
Of course, no matter how similar two individuals are to one another, there will inevitably
be differences. While emphasizing similarities in a relationship does not necessarily mean one is
assuming a weak relationality, how one views difference will generally give away one’s
assumptions. Consider the Denke’s (1999) claim that when a couple takes her advice, all their
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“petty differences…and differences of opinion [can] melt away” (p. 13). For Denke, some
differences of opinion are not important enough to hold on to and can (and should) melt away.
She goes on to say that, when differences arise in her own marriage and an agreement cannot be
reached, “we…laugh, hug each other, and say something that would make the other laugh”
(p.16). Ignoring differences or hoping that they “melt away” make differences appear to be a
threat to the relationship. When marriage is built on similarities, as it must be from a weak
relationality, then differences must be glossed over or the marriage is potentially in peril.
A strong relationality, on the other hand, views differences as just a valuable to the
relationship as similarities, because they are part of the relationship. Sameness is not the focus of
a marriage. Instead, a strong relationality acknowledges the differences within a couple as an
important part of the relationship. When one ignores or glosses over the differences between her
and her spouse, she refuses the personal relationship with her spouse (Macmurray, 1999). In
other words, she fails to engage her spouse honestly by failing to engage with the whole of the
relationship (both the similarities and the differences). A strong relationality values what might
be called the reality of the relationship, the shared context and constitutive being. For a person to
be able to live into her constitutive relationship and engage honestly with her spouse, she must
embrace the relationship as a whole, including both the similarities and the differences which
maintain a good relationship.
But it is not enough to simply engage with all similarities and all differences in a
relationship. Some similarities and some differences will actually be detrimental to the marriage.
For example, both a husband and a wife could “agree” that divorce is necessary. Though the
couple is similar in their feelings toward their marriage, that similarity actually represents a
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threat to the marriage. Relationships are not created from a strong relationality; consequently, the
issue of quality has less to do with sameness and agreement, and more to do with whether the
marriage is being nurtured or neglected. In other words, similarities and differences must be
confronted, but not because one is better than the other; each needs to be confronted because
either can be good or bad for the relationship. As I quoted before, marriages “should be good
rather than satisfying” to the individuals (Slife & Wiggins, in press, p. 20).
Self-interest versus Shared Goods
Self-interest is in its own way a fairly subtle assumption made by many in the marriage
culture. Few are willing to admit to pure selfishness in marriage, and even fewer believe the
selfishness is good for a marriage. However, self-interest is still at the center of many marriages.
Consider what Denke (1999) implies about happiness in marriage. In discussing unity in problem
solving, she claims that it is important that both spouses feel good about the solution. If one
spouse does not feel good about the solution, a new solution ought to be examined. Denke’s
emphasis on good personal feelings betrays her commitment to a weak relationality: any good
solution in marriage necessitates that each individual feel good about it. Her emphasis is not on
whether the solution is good for the marriage; rather she emphasizes that the interests of each self
ought to first be met. Further, Denke warns that if this problem solving procedure is not followed,
then unhappiness will likely ensue, which for Denke means the relationship is poor. But defining
the good as happiness, coupled with the good feelings that arise at finding a mutually satisfying
solution, focuses the couple’s attention on their own personal interests, not necessarily the good
of the relationship.
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That is not to say that unhappiness is the mark of a good relationship, or that good
feelings are characteristic of a bad marriage. But the focus on the self and on the self’s interest –
such as her happiness or her good feelings – manifests the weak relationality that is being
assumed by Denke and others who think similarly about marriage. For the weak relationist, the
individual’s atomized state and relationship’s secondary state both imply that self and its needs
should be put above the relationship. Another example from Denke demonstrates the subtlety
with which self-interest can creep into a marriage based on a weak relationality. Denke writes
about what she calls her Platinum Rule of marriage, which is: “Do unto your spouse as they
would want you to do unto them” (p. 171). While the Platinum Rule appears selfless, it cannot
avoid the atomism that characterizes weak relationality, nor the focus on the self and the self’s
interest, even if the self in an other. The rule is to do what the other would want, not necessarily
what is best for the relationship. The focus is, again, on the atomized self.
The strong relationist values the good of the relationship above the good of the atomized
self. This good – a shared good – is one which belongs to both spouses simultaneously, to the
marriage as a whole. Shared goods, as described by Fowers (2005), is the idea that “what is good
for [one] is inseparable from what is good for others” (p. 45). Denke’s Platinum Rule makes little
sense from this perspective, as the doer of the deed can do nothing for the good of her spouse
without doing what is best for her as well. All shared goods are shared by the whole of the
relationship, including one’s relationship to family and community. Because marriage is a
particular relationship – contextually distinct from other communal relationships – a married
couple will have shared goods that are specific to the couple and their relation to one another and
the community. Belonging to both spouses, these shared goods should be pursued by both
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spouses – even if pursuing the goods involves some sort of unhappiness or discomfort for either
or both spouses.
Determining what these shared goods are will depend upon the context of the couple,
both in their community and in the context of marriage functionally and historically. For
example, one shared good might be a virtuous marriage. Determining how to define a virtuous
marriage will depend upon the couple’s situation within their community, their obligation to the
community and their obligation to each other as members of that community. But a virtuous
marriage will also depend in part upon what marriage is; that is, its function in the family and the
community, both presently and historically. In this way, determining what the virtuous marriage
is supposed to be cannot depend entirely upon the self, one’s personal feeling about the
relationship, or whether one is happy or not. Instead, it must depend upon the context of the
marriage.
Instrumentalism versus Responsibly Relating
Once self-interest becomes the focus of a marriage, it is an easy step to instrumentalism.
A marriage whose end goal is happiness or good feelings is one that has already separated the
means (marriage) from the ends (personal fulfillment). Consequently, marriage is potentially
reduced to a mere tool, one meant solely to satisfy the interests of the self. One sees clearly how
this plays out in the marriage culture when one considers the way communication is discussed.
Denke (1999) provides us with another good example of this. For her, one of the purposes of
communication is for one individual to let the other know that her feelings have been hurt; that is,
one should communicate when one’s interests have not been satisfied. In this way,
communication is an instrument that facilitates good marriages, which marriages in turn become
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instruments to facilitate one feeling good. Self-interest and instrumentalism become the focus
and weak relationality dominates our assumptions.
When instrumentalism is assumed, it can be difficult to see the value of any relationships,
as working with others can so easily get in the way of personal fulfillment. Instrumentalism helps
to explain to why some relationships are pursued by those for whom self-interest is a high
priority. Social exchange theory is one way to explain how this happens (Reber & Osbeck, 2005).
Any self-interested individual looking out for her own interests will ultimately run into problems
when she is confronted with one whose interests differ; her interests will eventually get in the
way of the other’s interests, leaving the two at a potential impasse. To prevent this impasse from
ruining the relationship, a social contract can be drawn – an agreement between the two
individuals – that will assure that one serves the interests of the other as long as one’s interests
are served in return. In this way, one’s satisfaction can be assured – even increased – through the
instrumental use of another. This may seem a harsh way of looking at relationships, but in fact, it
is not uncommon in the marriage culture to assume instrumentalism, and then use a language that
merely softens this approach to marriage. In fact, we can use Denke’s (1999) language to
demonstrate how this can occur in marriage. As I stated above, Denke’s ideal is a marriage that
leads to happiness. If we understand the Platinum Rule in this context, then a couple’s social
contract may look something like this: do unto your spouse what they would want you to do unto
them, otherwise your marriage will fail to make you happy. While it is true that Denke herself
does not present her advice in this specific way, one can see how easily it is implied when one is
assuming a weak relationality to begin with.
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Instrumentalism in marriage implies a particular form of obligation. From a weak
relationality, obligations always originate from within the self and always remain personal and
self-contained. Obligations in relationships are not to the relationships, but are rather to the self.
Consequently, as we saw above, one’s obligation to marriage ends once the marriage fails to
fulfill the individual. Practically, this means that one’s decision to remain married – or in other
words, one’s commitment to the marriage – is an isolated decision based entirely on how one
feels about the marriage. There is no real obligation to the marriage itself, to one’s spouse, or
even to one’s family or community when it comes to making that decision. In this way, the only
difference between marriage and other relationships are the commitments that a couple makes
specifically to one another, such as monogamous commitments. This type of marriage, common
in American culture, has been called the “companionate marriage,” which Taylor (1989) says
“leads to a greater place for contractual agreement….assertion of personal autonomy, and
voluntarily formed ties” (p. 290, emphasis mine). The voluntary nature of these commitments
makes them all the easier to break, particularly when the “contract” is broken. Thus
instrumentalism unites all three features: one whose choice is self-contained is interested
primarily in herself and therefore forms relationships which serve the self, her obligation only
ever being primarily to herself.
Obligations take on a very different face when one assumes a strong relationality in that
they put the relationship before one’s obligation to the self. Indeed, for one to put self before the
relationship is to isolate oneself, which as we saw above is impossible from a strong relationality.
This is no small point, particularly when considering one’s responsibility as co-constitutor of the
context. A person’s obligations are not owed to herself, but are always extended outward into the
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relationships between the person and her context. Given a person’s unique situation in her
context, she is the only person capable of fulfilling those obligations, thus the responsibility
alone is hers. In a marriage, one’s obligation is first to the marriage. Even more, it is an
obligation to the marriage in its context, which means that neither is the marriage itself isolated
in any abstract way from other relationships. Thus one’s obligation to the marriage must be
informed by the marriage in the context of the couple, the family, and the community.
This difference might be better illustrated by an example. Consider a young man
contemplating marriage. One of the most important choices he will make will be who he decides
to marry. This choice carries with it certain obligations from both relational perspectives. From a
weak relationality, he is only obligated to himself when making that choice. Fulfilling that
obligation might consist in understanding whether his future spouse will make him happy,
support him in fulfilling his dreams, and satisfy him sexually, and whether he can serve her
needs to such an extent as to assure that she will continue fulfilling his. From a strong
relationality, his obligations are always to his relationships to others in his context. For instance,
he will also recognize that choosing who to marry will affect his family, and so be sure that he is
considering his obligations to his family in making his choice. He might also consider the
community of which he is a part, and whether his specific marriage will help fulfill his
obligations to his community. And of course, his choice will perhaps more immediately affect
his future spouse, so he ought to consider his love for her, and whether his love is good enough
to build a marriage and fulfill any obligation to her implied by marriage. What are important
from a strong relationality are the young man’s relationships and his obligation as a coconstituter of his context.
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These obligations are still voluntary, to a degree. Indeed, just like from a weak
relationality, entering into a marriage voluntarily is part of what sets marriage apart from other
relationships. However, that is not all that sets marriage apart. Marriage itself has a context and a
history that cannot be ignored when it comes to choosing to marry and choosing who to marry.
When one chooses to enter into marriage, from a strong relational perspective, that choice
necessarily carries with it certain responsibilities, responsibilities that are as tied to the history
and context of marriage as they are tied to family and community. Treating marriage as an object
or a tool would not just do violence to one’s particular marriage, but also to marriage in general.
Instead, a person has certain obligations toward marriage by virtue of her relationship to
marriage, to whom she is married, and to the community wherein the marriage occurs.
Communication will not center on how marriage can serve the couple. Instead, where
communication needs to take place, it would need to center on how the couple can best serve
their marriage and family. Figuring out what the good marriage is, however, will always be
contextual. Given the contextuality of marriage, any communication must be humble
communication, requiring openness toward others and toward changing circumstances, both of
which will offer “new insights regarding our pursuit of what is good” (Fowers, 2005, p. 44). The
goal of having a good marriage will not focus a couple’s attention on getting happiness or
satisfaction from the marriage, but rather on living a good marriage. In this way, marriage
becomes an end, and actions and goals are the same. By avoiding instrumentalism and aligning
the means and ends of a good marriage, couples can live into a wholeness that is only available
when they are living into the truth of marriage.
Conclusion
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I have by no means exhausted the implications of either weak or strong relationality in
this chapter. However, what I have presented here should give the reader a good idea of the
differences between the two, particularly as they relate to marriage. It should be clear first of all
that assuming a weak relationality is, practically, the same as assuming individualism. The fact
that individualism and one type of relationality can coexist demonstrates that avoiding
individualism is not as easy as it seems. Strong relationality, on the other hand, is a viable
alternative – one that avoids the individualistic assumptions scholars worry plague marriage.
Determining which relationality marital scientists are drawing upon should therefore reveal
whether and to what extent individualism is being assumed by the marital sciences.
By fleshing out each ontology’s implications for marriage, this chapter has also served
another important purpose. In Table 1, I have composed a summary of the primary differences
between a weakly relational and a strongly relational marriage. As we come to the analysis in a
later chapter, this table, in conjunction with the more fleshed out explanations in this chapter,
will assist in determining which relationality is being assumed. The measures, in their implied
conceptualizations of marriage and marital assessment, will also imply either a weak or a strong
relationality, thus revealing the assumptions which underlie the measures themselves.

41

Table 1
Differences Between Weak and Strong Relationality
Weak Relationality (Individualism)

Strong Relationality

Atomism: individuals are
fundamentally self-contained, and
therefore relationships are secondary
to individuals; relationships are
exclusively built upon similarities

Holism: relationships are fundamental to
reality and one’s identity can only be
understood in relation to others;
similarities and differences are part of the
whole relationship

Self-interest: an emphasis on
fulfilling the individuals’ needs and
wants over the interest of the
relationship

Shared goods: a focus on the interest of
the relationship over the good of the self

Instrumentalism: a relationship
serves as a means to an individuals’
own good; self satisfaction is assured
through social contracts; obligation is
to the self rather than the relationship

Responsibility Relating: a relationship is
the end, the purpose; obligations are to
the relationship in context rather than the
self
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LITERATURE REVIEW
In the previous chapter, I constructed a rough framework for my analysis by
describing the two ontologies which will guide the analysis. This brief chapter is devoted to
describing the process which I underwent to determine which measures in the marital sciences
would be most appropriate to analyze. When it comes to psychological measures in the social
and marital sciences, there are hundreds of options to choose from. My goal here was to
determine a group of measures that is both manageable for this type of project, as well as
representative of measurement in the marital sciences. To accomplish this goal, I consulted the
assessment literature from a number of different angles, which I describe below. Through this
review of the literature, I identify the most often used measures that appear in the marital science
literature, including five self-report measures and two behavioral observation coding systems.
After describing the process for the literature review, I list and describe each of the measures.
Type of Measure
Before determining which measures to analyze, I first considered which type of measure I
ought to include. Marital researchers rarely investigate marriage without attempting to
understand more specific aspects of marriage, such as how the relationship affects more
individual problems. As I am concerned primarily with how marital researchers view marriage, I
decided to focus on those measures that claim specifically to measure marriage, or the status of
the marriage. These types of measures have been called “global” measures and generally focus
on marital satisfaction or adjustment (e.g., Whisman & Jacobson, 1992). Global measures can
generally be distinguished from other instruments that are designed to measure more specific
dimensions of a relationship, such as a couple’s disagreement about finances (Snyder, 1979).
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There are two particular reasons that justify my focus on “global” measures for my
analysis. First, these measures are more relationship-focused than other measures used by marital
researchers (such as the Sexual Attitude Scale, intended to measure one’s individual attitudes
about human sexuality; see Fischer & Corcoran, 2007). As my goal is to understand how
strongly relational the measures potentially are, I am more likely to find a strong relationality in
a measure that is oriented toward the relationship than one oriented toward the individual. The
second reason for focusing on global measures is that these measures are often used in
conjunction with other more individually oriented measures anyway.
For example, McLean et al. (2008) used both the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS; a
highly popular marital adjustment scale) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; a highly
popular measure of individual depression) to determine the effects of couple therapy on
advanced cancer patients and their spouses. Though the focus of this study is on the effect of
couple therapy as a treatment for an individual’s depression, the DAS is used to determine
whether the couple therapy is working as it should (that is, whether the couple therapy is also
improving the couple’s marriage). In other words, even when marital researchers are primarily
concerned with individuals, they still use global measures in conjunction with their individual
measures. This means that global measures are not only more relational than other measures, but
are also more pervasive in marital research.
Literature Review
Initial Search
Given this criteria, I constructed an initial list of global measures that are being used
currently in the literature. I am interested in the current state of the discipline, not its historic
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state, so I limited my search to publications within the last decade. In order to get as broad a
sample of measures as possible, I consulted two different sets of publications. The first set was
books, such as instrument anthologies (e.g., Fischer & Corcoran, 2007) and marital therapy
sourcebooks and handbooks (e.g., Stabb, 2005; Bagarozzi & Sperry, 2004; Johnson, 2002).
These books pointed me to both research studies verified by global measures and the actual
measures themselves. I kept a list of each global measure mentioned by the literature, as well as
a tally of how often each measure was mentioned.
The second set of publications was journal articles. Several meta-analyses from the last
decade were consulted in order to find sources that recorded successful marital therapy (see
sources below). These sources were then consulted directly to determine which measures were
used in conducting the studies. Because meta-analyses are always a few years behind more upto-date research, I also consulted PsycINFO. PsycINFO is an internet database that indexes and
abstracts more than 2,450 journals and hundreds of books and dissertations (“PsycINFO,” 2009).
Updated weekly, it is as up-to-date a database as there is. Using the search terms “marital
therapy,” marriage therapy,” and “couple therapy,” I looked through the last decade of results,
consulting directly studies which were marriage focused, as opposed to individual focused. I
added any new measures to the previous list, including a tally of those and the previous
measures.
Overall, I surveyed 10 books (Bagarozzi & Sperry, 2004; Carr, 2000; Corcoran &
Fischer, 2000; Fischer & Corcoran, 2007; Fincham, Beach & Kemp-Fincham, 1997; Gollan &
Jacobson, 2002; Halford, Markman, Stanley, & Kline, 2002; Sholevar & Schwoeri, 2003;
Johnson, 2002; Stabb, 2005), 10 meta-analyses (Baucom, Mueser, Shoham, Daiuto, & Stickle,
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1998; Butler & Wampler, 1999; Gollan & Jacobson, 2002; Heyman, 2001; Johnson, Hunsley,
Greenberg, & Schindler, 1999; Johnson & Lebow, 2000; Shadish & Baldwin, 2003; Snyder,
Catellani, & Whisman, 2006; Spitalnick & McNair, 2005; Wood, 2004), and 46 studies (Allen &
Olson, 2001; Andrews, Foster, Capaldi, & Hops, 2000; Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna &
Heyman, 2000; Atkins, Berns, George, Doss, Gattis, & Christensen, 2005; Atkins, Eldridge,
Baucom, & Christensen, 2005; Baucom, Atkins, Simpson, & Christensen, 2009; Bradley &
Furrow, 2004; Brown, 2007; Chambers, 2008; Christensen, 2008; Christensen, Atkins, Berns,
Wheeler, Baucom, & Simpson, 2004; Christensen, Atkins, Yi, Baucom, & George, 2006;
Clouteir, Manion, Walker, & Johnson, 2002; Cordova, Jacobson, & Christensen, 1998; Croyle &
Waltz, 2002; Dalton, 2005; Denton, Burleson, Clark, Rodriguez, & Hobbs, 2000; Doss, Thum,
Sevier, Atkins, & Christensen, 2005; Erwin, 2008; Feeny, 2002; Fincham, Harold, & GanoPhillips, 2000; Gattis, 2005; Gee, Scott, Castellani, & Cordova, 2002; Gottman & Levenson,
2000; Goudelock, 2007; Hahlweg, Kaiser, Christensen, Fehm-Wolfsdor, & Groth, 2000;
Hahlweg, Markman, Thurmaier, Engl, & Eckert, 1998; Halford, Sanders, & Behrens, 2001;
Jacobson, Prince, Cordova, Christensen, & Eldridge, 2000; Johnson & Boisvert, 2002;
Ledermann, Bodenmann, & Cina, 2007; Lundblad & Hansson, 2006; MacIntosh & Johnson,
2008; McLean, Jones, Rydall, Walsh, Esplen, Zimmermann et al., 2008; McMurray, 2006;
Moore, McCabe, & Brink, 2001; Moynehan & Adams, 2007; O’Connor, McCabe, & Firth, 2008;
Reinke, 2005; Scott & Cordova, 2002; Simpson, Gattis, Atkins, & Christensen, 2008; Tillotson,
2008; Tremblay, Wright, Mamodhoussen, Mcduff & Sabourin, 2008; Trudel, Boyer, Villeneuve,
Anderson, Pilon & Bounader, 2008; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000; Yasan & Gurgen, 2009)
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Table 2 lists all 40 relevant measures mentioned in these sources, along with a count of
how often each measure was mentioned.
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Table 2
Initial List of Measures and Frequency Count
Measure
Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS)
Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test (MAT)
Marital Satisfaction Inventory - Revised (MSI-R)
Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale (KMSS)
Quality of Marriage Index (QMI)
Communication Patters Questionnaire (CPQ)
Areas of Change Questionnaire (ACQ)
PREPARE/ENRICH
Relationship Assessment Scale (RAS)
Marital Status Inventory (MSI)
Marital Communication Questionnaire (MCQ)
KPI (Observational Measure)
Marital Conventionalization Scale (MCS)
Marital Happines Scale (MHS)
Positive Feelings Questionnaire (PFQ)
Primary Communication Inventory (PCI)
Marital Adjustment Balance Scale (MABS)
Couples Interaction Scoring System (CISS)
Couples Interaction Scoring System - Revised (CISS-R)
Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF)
Marital Interaction Coding System - Revised (MICS-R)
Personal Assessment of Intimacy in Relationships - Revised (PAIR-R)
Maudsley Marital Questionnaire (MMQ)
Marital Interaction Coding System (MICS)
Couple's Critical Incidents Check List (CCICL)
Beier-Sternberg Discord Questionnaire (DQ)
Index of Marital Satisfaction (IMS)
Kansas Marital Conflict Scale (KMCS)
Marital Comparison Level Index (MCLI)
Marital Instability Index (MII)
Marital Quality Index (MQI)
SMU Relationship Questionnaire
Conflict Tactics Scale - Revised (CTS-2)
Frequency & Acceptability of Partner Behavior Questionnaire (FAPBQ)
Emotionally Focused Therapy Coding Scheme (EFT-CS)

Initial
Frequency
39
13
11
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table 2 (cont.)
Measure
Miller Social Intimacy Scale (MSIS)
Oral History Coding
Marital Satisfaction Scale (MSS)
Self-Dyadic Perspective Taking
Other-Dyadic Perspective Taking
Couples Mutuality Questionnaire

Initial
Frequency
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Final List
My intent is only to understand how marriage is popularly understood by marital
researchers through the most often used marital measures, thus I did not analyze all 40 of the
global measures identified. Instead, I narrowed down the list of 40 measures to a more
manageable list of those measures being used. To do so, I did another search using PsycINFO,
this time adding several other databases to the search, including Academic Search Premier,
Family and Society Studies Worldwide, PsycARTICLES, PsycBOOKS, PsycCRITIQUES,
PsycEXTRA, Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection, Social Science Abstracts, and
Social Work Abstracts. My intent was to access as many sources as possible where marital
researchers might publish to give me as representative a sample of studies as possible. For the
search term, I used the full name of the measure (with some exceptions; see notes in Table 3).
For this search, I attended primarily to the number of hits each of the measures obtained.
Each measure and its respective number of hits are recorded in Table 3. I recorded three numbers
for each measure: the first column contains the number of hits from the current decade (20002009); the second column contains the number of hits from the previous decade (1990-1999);
and the final column contains the number of total hits. I did this to check for general trends in
measure usage, in case a newer measure was showing substantial increased use. The only
measure that fit this criterion was the Central Relationship Questionnaire (CRQ), however closer
inspection of those studies wherein the CRQ is used reveals that none in the search deal
specifically with marriage. Thus the only numbers I used in determining which measures to
analyze are in the final column, containing the number of hits in the last decade.
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Table 3
Final List of Measures and Frequency Count
Measure
Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS)*
ENRICH*a
Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test (MAT)*
Marital Satisfaction Inventory - Revised (MSI-R)*
Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale (KMS)*
Personal Assessment of Intimacy in Relationships (PAIR)
Marital Satisfaction Scale (MSS) b
Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF)* c
Communication Patterns Questionnaire (CPQ)
Marital Interaction Coding System (MICS)*
Maudsley Marital Questionnaire (MMQ)
Relationship Assessment Scale (RAS) d
Central Relationship Questionnaired
Quality of Marriage Index (QMI)
Index of Marital Satisfaction (IMS)
Other-Dyadic Perspective Taking
Marital Status Inventory (MSI)
Couples Interaction Scoring System (CISS)
Marital Comparison Level Index (MCLI)
Primary Communication Inventory (PCI)
Areas of Change Questionnaire (ACQ)
Marital Happiness Scale (MHS)
Positive Feelings Questionnaire (PFQ)
Marital Conventionalization Scale (MCS)
Marital Quality Index (MQI)
Self-Dyadic Perspective Taking
KPI (Observational Measure)e
Kansas Marital Conflict Scale (KMCS)
Marital Instability Index (MII)
Oral History Coding
Beier-Sternberg Discord Questionnaire (DQ)f
Emotionally Focused Therapy Coding Scheme (EFT-CS)g
Miller Social Intimacy Scale (MSIS)
Frequency & Acceptability of Partner Behavior (FAPBQ)
Marital Communication Questionnaire (MCQ)

Total 1990s
1368
192
399
184
129
75
94
28
38
80
25
17
9
18
41
16
40
19
15
30
50
23
10
28
8
5
2
2
6
2
4
2
6
1
2

651
63
123
80
57
28
31
7
20
35
6
7
1
9
24
8
15
5
7
11
15
2
0
15
4
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
2

Last
Decade
442
96
66
62
53
37
32
20
18
14
11
8
8
8
8
7
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
0
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Table 3 (cont.)
Measure
Marital Adjustment Balance Scale (MABS)h
Couple's Critical Incidents Check List (CCICL)
Couples Mutuality Questionnaire
Conflict Tactics Scale - Revised (CTS-2)i

Total 1990s
12
1
0

11
1
0

Last
Decade
0
0
0

* Measures used in the analysis
a

Using just “ENRICH” as a search term yielded thousands of hits, because of the often used verb enrich. Search

terms “enrich AND marriage” were used. bSearching “Marital Satisfaction Scale” only overlapped with ENRICH
and Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale. Search terms “Marital Satisfaction Scale NOT enrich NOT Kansas” were
used. cSearch terms “Specific Affect Coding System AND SPAFF” used because some studies use only the
abbreviation. dThis measure rarely used for marital studies. eKPI is also the acronym for a medical assessment
instrument. Search terms “KPI AND marriage” were used. fSearching the name of the measure yielded no results.
Search terms “DQ AND marriage” were used. gSearching the name of the measure yielded no results. Search terms
“EFT AND CS” were used. hSearching the name of the measure yielded no results. Search terms “MABS AND
marriage” were used. iThough mentioned in the literature, the CTS-2 is not a relevant measure; that is, it is not a
global measure.
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It is important to keep in mind that the number of hits in the past decade does not capture
perfectly the number of times a measure is being used. However, given the breadth and scope of
the databases searcher, the number of hits should give a general idea of a measure’s proportional
use in the literature. For example, the Marital Happiness Scale (MHS) obtained three hits in the
last decade, whereas the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS) obtained 442 with the same search
criteria. While it is quite likely the MHS has been used more than three times this decade, it is
likely also true that the DAS has been used more than 442 times. Thus the number of hits should
give us a rough idea of how the MHS and the DAS are used in proportion to one another: for
every time the MHS is used, we can safely assume the DAS is used around 100 times or more.
If one refers to Table 3, it becomes clear which measures are the most popular. The DAS
is used with far more frequency than any other global measure; four times more frequently than
the second most popular measure, ENRICH. This should come as no surprise to those familiar
with marital assessment, as it is often used as a benchmark for measurement of relationships in
the marital sciences (see, for example, Johnson & Jacob, 2000; Whisman & Jacobson, 1992) and
is pervasive in marital research. Second on the list, the ENRICH inventory is still moderately
popular, but after that, the popularity of other measures significantly diminishes in comparison to
the DAS. A measure with fewer than 50 hits (1 hit for every 9 DAS hits) is obviously used with
far less frequency than the DAS so will not get nearly the attention that the DAS will receive in
research. The Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test (MAT), the Marital Satisfaction Inventory
(MSI), and the Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale (KMS), all obtained over 50 hits, and will be
included in the analysis.
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I should point out that the five scales that obtained over 50 hits are all self-report scales.
Self-report refers to the fact that these scales are administered directly to individuals in a
marriage, who then answer the set of questions required by the scale. In other words, married
individuals themselves report on the state of their marriage by responding to the questions in the
measure. This type of scale dominates the marital sciences but is not the only type of scales
available to marital scientists.
Behavioral observation coding systems, while not as often used as self-report, are also an
important part of the marital sciences (Weiss & Heyman, 1990). This type of measure focuses
not on the couple’s own report of their marriage, but rather on the trained observation of couples
interacting. The couple’s behaviors are coded according to categories which determine whether
the couple is distressed or well-adjusted. In order to account for these important measures, I
decided to include the two measures which obtained the most hits on my search, the Marital
Interaction Coding System (MICS) and the Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF), both of
which obtained more than 10 hits in the last decade. These two are the most consistently
mentioned measures in the literature and, according to Table 3; the next observational measure
mentioned (Couples Interaction Scoring System) received only 5 hits.
When one compares their hit count to the others, their use seems minute compared to the
use of the DAS, or even ENRICH; however, two reasons justify their inclusion in this analysis.
First of all, their seeming lack of popularity is primarily due to the cost (both in time and money)
associated with using these measures (L’Abate & Bagarozzi, 1993). In contrast to self-report
measures, their popularity is limited somewhat by expense. Consequently, 20 hits for a
behavioral measure cannot exactly compare to a larger number of hits for a self-report measure.
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Second, proponents of behavioral observation measures point out that in spite of their cost, they
have a very different perspective on marital interaction – one that couples may or may not notice
(and therefore may or may not report) and one may therefore more accurately measure the
success or failure of the relationship (see Gottman, 1999). Given these two reasons, it seemed
prudent to include these two measures in the analysis.
All measures used for the ensuing analysis are denoted by an asterisk in Table 3. Below, I
list each of the measure and briefly describe the measure and its context in the literature.
Measures Included in the Analysis
The Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS)
In 1976, Spanier, in hopes of addressing some of the methodological problems to which
other measures of marriage were subject – including the MAT, described below – developed the
DAS. The DAS is in part meant to “assess the quality of adjustment in marital relationships” as
well as other relational dyads (p. 15). It is by far the most often used measure today, both in
marital research and in the development of other measures, receiving 442 hits for the last decade
(see, for example, Schumm, Paff-Bergen, Hatch, Obiorah, Copeland, Meens et al., 1986).
ENRICH Marital Satisfaction Scale (EMS)
The ENRICH Inventory (evaluation and nurturing relationship issues, communication,
and happiness) is a large measure designed to measure differing dimensions of marital
interaction. One item from each of the ten dimensions was added to a five-item Idealistic
Distortion scale to create the EMS (Fowers & Olson, 1993). The EMS is one of only a few
marital measures that have readily available national norms and is “administered to thousands of
couples seeking marital therapy or enrichment every year” (p. 178). Another unique feature of
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the EMS is that it presents with a positive couple agreement score, designed to provide a dyadic
measurement by measuring the couple as a unit. It received the second most number of hits, 96
in the last decade.
The Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test (MAT)
The MAT was intended to be a “short, but reliable, and valid, marital-adjustment [test]”
in contrast to the longer tests which had, up to the point at which it was written, been in use
(Locke & Wallace, 1959, p. 251). After its development, it quickly became the most widely used
measure in the marital sciences (Snyder, 1979). While its use has declined somewhat in recent
years (see Table 3), it is still one of the most often used measures and has played an important
role in the development of other measures, obtaining 66 hits in the last decade (see, for example,
Snyder, 1979; Roach, Frazier, & Bowden, 1981; Gottman & Krokoff, 1989).
Marital Satisfaction Inventory (MSI)
The Marital Satisfaction Inventory received 62 hits in the last decade. It was developed in
part in reaction to other measures, such as the MAT and the DAS, criticized as assessing “not the
marital relationship itself, but rather individual adjustment to that relationship” (Snyder, 1979, p.
814). The measure was intended to address this problem. The measure includes eleven different
scales, including a global affective scale, a validity scale, and nine scales measuring specific
dimensions of marital interaction. Of the eleven scales, I will be using the global affective scale,
entitled the Global Distress Scale.
Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale (KMS)
The KMS is meant to be “a valid but briefer measure” of marital adjustment (Schumm et
al., 1986, p. 381). Relatively later to come on the scene, the three-item KMS has become a

56

frequently used measure in the marital sciences, primarily because of its short nature combined
with its validity. It received 53 hits in the last decade.
Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF)
The SPAFF is a behavioral coding system used to identify distressed couples based on
their behavior. Based on the empirical findings of several researchers, Gottman and Krokoff
(1989) concluded that negative interactions are far more prevalent in unhappily married couples.
The SPAFF was designed to “[separate] the global category of negative interaction into its
components to determine whether [certain ‘negative’ emotions are] in fact the key to
understanding marital distress” (p. 47). In other words, the SPAFF is used specifically to identify
key negative behaviors most associated with those couples whose marriages are most likely to
end in divorce. The SPAFF received 20 hits.
Marital Interaction Coding System (MICS)
The MICS began as an observational coding system for families with problem children
(L’Abate & Bagarozzi, 1993). In 1970, it evolved into a coding system used for marital
interaction and quickly became the most statistically sound and popular behavioral measure of
marital interaction. It is used primarily to code the behaviors of married couples according to a
system meant to determine whether the couple’s behavior is like that of a well-adjusted or
maladjusted couple. Its categories focus both on the behavior and the verbal and nonverbal affect
of a couple (Weiss & Heyman, 1990). The MICS received 14 hits in the last decade.
These seven measures will provide the data for my analysis, which will be described in
detail in the next chapter.
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METHOD AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I present the analysis of those measures discussed in the previous chapter.
This is an ontological analysis, drawing upon the two contrasting ontologies which I described in
chapter two, abstractionism, or weak relationality, and strong relationality. I begin this chapter
by describing the manner in which I performed the analysis, or the method, called contrasting
relations. My methodological description includes a description of how I use the contrasting
ontologies to understand the underlying assumptions of the measures. After describing the
method, I give an account of the actual analysis. As I stated previously, I am analyzing the
content, the process, and the practice of the measures, so this section is divided into three parts.
Within each section, self-report measures and behavioral observation systems are analyzed
separately. The contents of this analysis should indicate to the reader whether a weak
relationality is at the foundation of the outcome measures most often used by marital scientists,
or whether marital scientists are using measures that truly assume a strong relationality.
Method: Contrasting Relations
The method used in this analysis is called a contrasting relations approach, but it is better
known historically as the dialectical method. The basic idea is to understand ideas and
assumptions underlying the measure by comparing them to contrasting ideas; that is, by
understanding what the current underlying ideas and assumptions are not. Relations of similarity
are also analyzed, but the analysis here requires distinguishing between ontological conceptions
that are often taken-for-granted or given axiomatic status. As Rychlak (1981) and Slife (2004)
contend, “hidden assumptions” are not visible or made “alive” to us by describing what they are
like (similarity relations). With axiomatic assumptions, similarity relations are often experienced
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as statements of fact or “the way things are,” rather than statements of assumptions or points of
view. Consequently, contrasting relations are pivotal to assumptive analyses, especially deeply
rooted presuppositions, such as ontological conceptions. Indeed, when educators of critical
thinking advocate the development of alternative assumptions, it is primarily with this function
of contrasting relations in mind (e.g., Brookfield, 1987).
This is not a new approach to understanding. Indeed, it is at least as old as the ancient
Greek philosophers (Rychlak, 1981). Socrates used contrasting (dialectical) relations to come to
an understanding of truth. He believed that we should subject all of our notions – our opinions or
beliefs about what is true – to criticism (Seeskin, 1987). Doing so “requires that two voices be
heard,” one countering the other (p. 1). Plato employed a similar dialectic in his dialogues, where
he reveals his philosophy not through demonstration, but through conversations between
opposing parties. Contrasting ideas pitted against one another enable the reader to make her own
judgments between the ideas by virtue of the ideas’ relation to one another.
More modern philosophers have also depended on contrasting relations in their
philosophies. Hegel is somewhat famous for his use of the dialectic in his account of history
(Robinson, 1995). His method of understanding the progress of history begins with a “thesis,”
which is then countered by its “antithesis.” For Hegel, understanding something required
knowing not just what it is, but also what it is not (Low, 1987). Getting to truth, then, follows
this process of confrontation of ideas, “in which the reality of one point of view is shown from
the refutation of an earlier point of view” (Williams, 1987, p. 4). In other words, as with Socrates,
truth is arrived through contrasting opposing ideas with one another.
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Marx also employed contrasting relations in his Capital, where instead of offering a set
of definitions, concepts associated with his philosophy were defined by their relation to the
whole (Low, 1987). For example, Marx explains “commodity” by tracing its development
through its many historical forms (i.e., what “commodity” has meant historically in contrast to
what it means today), as well as the concept itself in contrasting relation to the totality of
concepts from which it derives its identity (such as “property” or “labor”). The method itself
focused on the whole, or on “relations and connections” (p. 190). This type of oppositional
thinking will be the foundation of my method. I will, in essence, put contrasting ideas next to one
another, in hopes of understanding and refining each concept. Doing so, I believe, is the best way
to understand underlying assumptions – particularly ontological assumptions, given their hidden
nature. As I mentioned above, ontological assumptions can seem like common sense, and if they
are not contrasted with other ontological perspectives, it is sometimes difficult to understand
“common sense” as anything other than fact.
My own use of the dialectic has characteristics unique to this dissertation. I draw in part
on the method used by Whoolery (2004). I begin by carefully evaluating the content of the
measures. By this, I mean to say the actual meanings of the items used to make up the measures.
In evaluating the content, I first identify the assumptions that likely led to the inclusion of the
content. Part of identifying the assumptions involves looking for themes in the data – in this case,
the measures’ items – that characterize the different items. These themes both organize the data
and assist in the analysis, helping to illuminate how the content was conceptualized. I then
briefly describe an alternative way to conceptualize the content, drawing on an alternative
ontology as a contrast to and clarification of the current underlying ontology. In the case of this
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dissertation, these opposing assumptions originate either in a weak or a strong relationality,
which I described in chapter 2. In other words, I evaluate the measures based on whether weakly
or strongly relational assumptions are being made in the content. If weak relational assumptions
are made, I attempt to show that by contrasting what the content would look like had strong
relational assumptions been made, and vice versa. In sum, I use the following steps in
completing the analysis:
1) Identify the assumptions underlying the inclusion of specific content in the measures, by
identifying themes into which each item falls;
2) Contrast the themes and assumptions with alternative assumptions, specifically by
offering examples of how the content would change or be different by making the
alternative assumptions;
3) Draw conclusions about the general assumptions being made through the use of their
meaning content, based on the contrasting relations in the first two steps.
I follow these same steps for both the process and practice of each measure. By process, I
mean the organizational development and structure of the measure; by practice, I mean how the
measure is used practically by researchers and clinicians in the marital sciences. In sum, in this
chapter I look carefully at the content, process, and practice of each measure identified in chapter
3 to analyze which assumptions underlie the measures. I draw upon the two categories of
ontological assumptions – weak relationality and strong relationality – to frame the analysis. I
anticipate that most of the assumptions being made will fit within the framework of either a weak
or a strong relationality, though it is possible that elements of the content, process, or practice do
not fit either ontology. Most scholarship on ontological assumptions stresses the prevalence, if
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not exclusive hold, of abstractionist ontologies on western culture and academia, often with only
a “dash” of strong relationality here and there (e.g., Taylor, 1989). Even materialism, perhaps the
most popular ontology currently, is a type of abstractionism because it takes no account of
context. Still, if I find conceptions that seem to fit with neither category of ontology, I will note
them and explore them. Otherwise, my primary purpose will be to identify the weak or strong
relational assumptions which underlie the measures.
Content Analysis
The purpose of this section is to present an analysis of the content of the measures
delineated in chapter 3. Because the content of self-report measures differs so much from the
content of behavioral measures, this section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I deal
exclusively with the content of the five self-report measures, including the Kansas Marital
Satisfaction Scale (KMS), the Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test (MAT), the ENRICH
Marital Satisfaction Scale (EMS), the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS), and the Global Distress
Scale of the Marital Satisfaction Index (MSI). In the second part, I deal exclusively with the
content of the behavioral measures, the Marital Interaction Coding System (MICS) and the
Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF).
Self-report Content
The content of the self-report measures is listed in its entirety in Table 4. Each individual
measure is listed with its respective items listed in the order they appear on the measure itself.
The exception is the MSI, which lists only those items in the Global Distress Scale along with
the numbering of each of the item. Each item on Table 4 has also listed next to it its scoring
value. That is, the numbers that appear next to the items are actual values that an administrator
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would award to that particular response. This would mean in some cases different points for
similar answers on different items. For example, if a respondent were to answer “Always Agree”
on MAT5, she would be awarded 5 points; if she answers “Always Agree” on MAT6, she would
be awarded 15 points. The first four measures are scored quantitatively, so each item has next to
it the numerical scores for each respective response. The final measure listed in Table 4 – the
MSI – consists of dichotomous items, requiring either a true or false response. On Table 4, I have
listed for these items the coded response, or that response which adds to the final score of the
respondent.
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Item
1. How satisfied are you with your
marriage?
2. How satisfied are you with your husband
as a spouse?
3. How satisfied are you with your
relationship with your husband?
1

Extremely
Dissatisfied

2

2

Very
Dissatisfied

3

3

3

4

4

4

5

5

5

Somewhat
Satisfied

6

6

6

Very
Satisfied

7

7

7

Extremely
Satisfied

Self-Report Measures Analyzed
Kansas Marital Satisfaction Scale

1
2

Somewhat
Dissatisfied Mixed

1

Always
Agree
5
5

Marital Adjustment Test
1. Check the dot on the scale which best describes the degree of happiness, everything considered, of your present marriage. The
middle point, "happy," represents the degree of happiness which most people get from marriage, and the scale gradually ranges on
one side to those few who are very unhappy in marriage, and on the other, to those few who experience extreme joy or felicity in
marriage.
0
2
7
15
20
25
35
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Very
Perfectly
Unhappy
Happy
Happy
State the approximate extent of agreement or disagreement between you and your mate on the following items.
Almost
Almost
Always Occasionally Frequently
Always
Always
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
4
3
2
1
0
4
3
2
1
0
2. Handling family finances
3. Matters of recreation
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Marital Adjustment Test (cont.)
8
6
4
2
1
0
4. Demonstration of affection
5
4
3
2
1
0
5. Friends
15
12
9
4
1
0
6. Sex relations
5
4
3
2
1
0
7. Conventionality (right, good or proper conduct)
5
4
3
2
1
0
8. Philosophy of life
5
4
3
2
1
0
9. Ways of dealing with in-laws
10. When disagreements arise, they usually result in: husband giving in (0), wife giving in (2), agreement by mutual give and take
(10).
11. Do you and your mate engage in outside interests together? All of them (10), some of them (8), very few of them (3), none of
them (0).

12. In leisure time do you generally prefer: to be "on the go"___, to stay at home___? Does your mate generally prefer: to be "on the
go" ___, to stay at home ___? (Stay at home for both, 10 points; "on the go" for both, 3 points; disagreement, 2 points.)
13. Do you ever wish you had not married? Frequently (0), occasionally (3), rarely (8), never (15).
14. If you had your life over, do you think you would: marry the same person (15), marry a different person (0), not marry at all (1)?
15. Do you confide in your mate: almost never (0), rarely (2), in most things (10), in everything (10)?

1

1

Strongly
Disagree

2

2

Moderately
Disagree

3

3

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

4

4

Moderately
Agree

5

5

Strongly
Agree

ENRICH Marital Satisfaction Scale

Items
(+) 1. My partner and I understand each other
perfectly.
(-) 2. I am not pleased with the personality
characteristics and personal habits of my partner.
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ENRICH Marital Satisfaction Scale (cont.)
(+) 3. I am very happy with how we handle role
1
2
responsibilities in our marriage.
(+) 4. My partner completely understands and
1
2
sympathizes with my every mood.
(-) 5. I am not happy about our communication and
1
2
feel my partner does not understand me.
1
2
(+) 6. Our relationship is a perfect success.
(+) 7. I am very happy about how we make decisions
1
2
and resolve conflicts.
(-) 8. I am unhappy about our financial position and
1
2
the way we make financial decisions.
(-) 9. I have some needs that are not being met by our
1
2
relationship.
(+) 10. I am very happy with how we manage our
leisure activities and the time we spend
1
2
together.
(+) 11. I am very pleased about how we express
1
2
affection and relate sexually.
(-) 12. I am not satisfied with the way we each
1
2
handle our responsibilities as parents.
(+) 13. I have never regretted my relationship with
1
2
my partner, not even for a moment.
(-) 14. I am dissatisfied about our relationship with
1
2
my parents, in-laws, and/or friends.

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5
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0

All the
time

Always
Agree
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1

Most of
the time

Almost
Always
Agree
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

2

More often
than not

Occasionally
Disagree
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3

Occasionally

Frequently
Disagree
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

4

Rarely

Almost
Always
Disagree
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

5

Never

Always
Disagree
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Dyadic Adjustment Scale
Most persons have disagreement in their relationships. Please indicate below the approximate extent of agreement of disagreement
between you and your partner for each item on the following list.

Item
1. Handling family finances
2. Matters of recreation
3. Religious matters
4. Demonstration of affection
5. Friends
6. Sex relations
7. Conventionality (correct or proper behavior)
8. Philosophy of life
9. Ways of dealing with parents or in-laws
10. Aims, goals, and things believed important
11. Amount of time spent together
12. Making major decisions
13. Household tasks
14. Leisure time interests and activities
15. Career decisions

16. How often do you discuss or have you
considered divorce, separation, or
terminating your relationship?
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Have a stimulating exchange of ideas
Laugh together
Calmly discuss something
Work together on a project

Never
0
0
0
0

Dyadic Adjustment Scale (cont.)
17. How often do you or your mate leave the
0
1
2
house after a fight?
18. In general, how often do you think that
things between you and your partner are
0
1
2
going well?
0
1
2
19. Do you confide in your mate?
20. Do you ever regret that you married? (or
0
1
2
lived together)
21. How often do you and your partner
0
1
2
quarrel?
22. How often do you and your mate "get on
0
1
2
each other's nerves?"
Almost
Every Day Every Day Occasionally
23. Do you kiss your mate?
4
3
2
All of
Most of
them
them
Some of them
24. Do you and your mate engage in outside
4
3
2
interests together?
How often would you say the following events occur between you and your mate?
Less than
once a
Once or twice
month
a month
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

25.
26.
27.
28.

1

Rarely
1
Very few of
them

3

3

3

3

3

3

Once a
day
4
4
4
4

0

Never
0
None of
them

4

4

4

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

5

5

More
often
5
5
5
5

Once or
twice a week
3
3
3
3
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Dyadic Adjustment Scale (cont.)
These are some things about which couples sometimes agree and sometimes disagree. Indicate if either item below caused
differences of opinions or were problems in your relationship during the past few weeks. (check yes or no)
Yes
No
29. Being too tired for sex.
0
1
30. Not showing love.
0
1
31. The dots on the following line represent different degrees of happiness in your relationship. The middle point, "happy,"
represents the degree of happiness in most relationships. Please circle the dot which best describes the degree of happiness, all
things considered, of your relationship.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Extremely
Fairly
A Little
Very
Extremely
Unhappy
Unhappy
Unhappy
Happy
Happy
Happy
Perfect
32. Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about the future of your relationship?
5 I want desperately for my relationship to succeed, and would go to almost
any length to see that it does.
4 I want very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do all I can to see
that it does.
3 I want very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do my fair share to
see that it does.
2 It would be very nice if my relationship succeeded, but I can't do much more
than I am doing now to help it succeed.
1 It would be nice if it succeeded, but I refuse to do any more than I am doing
now to keep the relationship going.
0 My relationship can never succeed, and there is no more that I can do to
keep the relationship going.
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Table 4 (cont.)
Global Distress (GDS)
Item Number and Full Text
16. There are many things about our relationship that please me.
18. Even when I am with my partner, I feel lonely much of the
time.
21. Our relationship has been very satisfying.
24. The good things in our relationship far outweigh the bad.
27. Two people should be able to get along better than my partner
and I do.
30. Our relationship is as successful as any that I know of.
35. I have often considered asking my partner to go with me for
relationship counseling.
53. Our relationship has been disappointing in several ways.
55. My partner and I have never come close to ending our
relationship.
58. I get pretty discouraged about our relationship sometimes.
61. My partner and I seldom have major disagreements.
64. I have never felt better in our relationship than I do now.
67. The future of our relationship is too uncertain for us to make
any serious plans.
72. My partner and I are happier than most of the couples I know.
90. I have important needs in our relationship that are not being
met.
92. At times I have very much wanted to leave my partner.
95. There are some serious difficulties in our relationship.
98. I might be happier if I weren't in this relationship.
101. I have often wondered whether our relationship may end in
separation or divorce.
104. I believe that our relationship is as pleasant as that of most
people I know.
109. I have known very little unhappiness in our relationship.
128. I believe that our relationship is reasonably happy.

Coded
Response
F
T
F
F
T
F
T
T
F
T
F
F
T
F
T
T
T
T
T
F
F
F
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I should note that meaning content is also decided by item “scoring.” The way in which
each item is scored by the administrator of the measure has implications for the content
underlying the item itself. For example, if an affirmative response to an item asking “Are you
honest” is awarded a better score, then honesty is valued. If, on the other hand, a negative
response is awarded a better score, dishonesty is valued above honest. Consequently, I will make
reference to the instrument’s prescribed scoring of the items as I narrate the content analysis. As
I mentioned above, Table 4 includes this scoring for each item. Note that for every measure,
except the MSI, higher scores represent “better” scores (a “better” score on the MSI is actually a
lower score; see Snyder, 1979), and for those employing the measures, better scores represent
better marriages.
As I prepared for this portion of the analysis, I noted that the content of many of the items
were highly related. These relationships suggested themes that are actually quite common in
psychology, namely affect, cognition, and behavior. That is, each of the items seemed to inquire
into the affect, cognition, or behavior of the individual to which the measure is administered.
These themes have been used frequently in psychology as a way of organizing psychological
phenomena (e.g., Kosslyn & Rosenbern, 2004), so these basic themes should not be especially
controversial in organizing these meanings. I used these three themes to organize the content and
classify each item into one of these categories. In the affect category, I have placed each item
that seems to inquire primarily into the affect, or the feelings and emotions of the married
respondent. In the cognition category, I have placed each item that seems to inquire primarily
into various cognitions, or the thoughts or beliefs the respondent might have about marriage. And
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in the behavior category, I have placed questions which inquire primarily into specific behaviors,
or those actions taken or considered by each married respondent.
Again, I was alert to any exceptions. If an item fit none of these categories, I noted it,
and if an item fit more than one category, I put it in all the relevant categories. In Table 5, I have
listed each of the three categories, as well as the various items included from each measure listed
under its respective category. The category label also has a cross-listing symbol next to it which
is used to indicate items in other categories that might also fit in the first category. For instance, I
have categorized EMS10 under affect, but it might also fit in the behavior category. Therefore, I
have noted the 10 in the EMS row with an asterisk, referring the reader to the behavior category
also noted by the asterisk. Notice that several items fit into more than one category. Below, I
include a more detailed description of the category in its respective section, as well as an
explanation for the inclusion of each of the items. I will refer to Table 5 in this explanation,
providing a justification for my inclusion of the various items in their respective categories.
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Measure
DAS
MAT
EMS
KMS
MSI

16‡
1
2
1
16

Categories and their Respective Items
Affect⁺
18‡
22
7

31
8

32

64

9
72

10*
90

11

98

12

104

13‡

109

14

128‡

15‡

Items
17
5
58

5
6⁺

6⁺
7

95

7
8

101

8
9

Items
9 10
10 13⁺

13

24‡ 53

4⁺
5

92

12

4‡
3
21

3
4⁺

67

11*
14⁺

3
2
18

2
3
6
61

Cognitive‡
1
2
1
35

26 27⁺ 28

30⁺

Behavioral*
Items
25

27⁺

Measure
DAS
MAT
EMS
KMS
MSI

19
11

24
15

55

23
12‡

Measure
DAS
MAT
EMS
KMS
MSI

14 15 20⁺

29⁺

30⁺
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Affect
The first category is labeled “affect.” Each item within this category inquires into the
feelings or emotionality of the person to whom the measure is administered. As we see below,
this includes items that almost exclusively purport to measure feelings such as satisfaction and
happiness, insofar as the emotions affect the marriage. This section includes a large percentage
of all items, as noted in Table 5, including several other items cross-listed in other categories.
As I performed the analysis of these items, I noted that the meanings of the items could
be grouped into four main themes. The four themes here identified help to capture the various
emphases on meanings implied by the “Affect” items, their wording and their scoring. Under the
first theme, entitled “Emphasis on Affect,” I discuss the meanings which seem to drive the
emphasis placed on affect by these items. The second theme, which is called “The Role of
Context,” I discuss how the items deal with the context of the affect and of marriage. The third
theme I have entitled “Emphasis on Self” wherein I investigate the role of the self implied by the
items, and whether the emphasis on the self suggests a weak or strong relationality. And finally,
the forth theme, I demonstrate the emphasis placed on self by these items. Under the final theme,
“Instrumental or Responsible Relating,” I discuss whether the meanings driving the content of
the “Affect” items suggest an “instrumental” or a “responsible” approach to relating, based on
the distinction I made between instrumentalism and responsible relating in Chapter Two.
Emphasis on Affect. The first meaning emerges when one considers the emphasis placed
on affect. One can see clearly how this emphasis plays out in both the KMS and the EMS. The
KMS, with only three questions, is entirely composed of items which inquire into the
individual’s satisfaction (with the marriage, the spouse, and the relationship with the spouse; see
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Table 4). Likewise, the EMS is also almost entirely “Affect” items, using key words such as
“happy” (items 3, 5, 7, & 10), “unhappy” (item 8), “pleased” (items 2 &11), “satisfied” (items 12
& 14), and “feel good” (item 15) to understand the emotional response of each person in respect
to his or her marriage. Other measures include items which use similar terms (e.g., DAS31,
MAT1, MSI 72 & 98 use happy or happiness). In all cases, those which are considered positive
emotions (e.g., happiness, satisfaction, or pleased, as opposed to unhappy or dissatisfied) score
better. In other words, the happier or more satisfied one is in marriage, the better one scores,
particularly on the KMS or EMS, which then supposedly translates into a better marriage. What
are valued above all by these items are the good feelings of the couple.
Recall that a key feature of weak relationality was atomism. As the atomized self is
fundamentally independent of others, he or she is often also considered the origin of the good –
in this case the good marriage. That is, the good marriage depends from this perspective on the
good of the isolated, atomized self. As no morality exists beyond what is self-contained, the good
from this perspective is often assumed to be the “positive” experiences of the self, often
expressed in personal emotionality (see Slife & Richardson, 2008). Valuing positive, private
emotions is a sign of weak relationality. That is, a weak relationality would likely assume that
the positive individual emotions are a key indication of the good marriage, which seems to be the
case with several of the affect items.
Had a strong relationality been assumed in the writing of these items, they certainly
would not focus on the positive affect of the individual. The strong relationist contends that
happiness and personal satisfaction do not necessarily indicate a good marriage, but that the good
marriage can be characterized by both positive and negative emotions. Consider for example, a
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marriage in which personal illness – perhaps even a terminal illness – has become an issue. This
marriage might require one spouse to sacrifice much of her time and efforts in taking care of the
afflicted. If the good of this marriage requires this type of sacrificing, it is possible that happiness
might be given up or play a rather limited role. Thus asking this couple how good they feel or
how satisfied they are might be to misunderstand the goodness of the marriage. Consider, on the
other hand, a perfectly healthy husband, who might spend several hours of his life in the brothel
while all the while cultivating a poor marriage at home, all for the sake of his happiness. His
marriage is poor in spite of his happiness.
The origin of the good for the strong relationist would not be the atomized individual, but
the relationship itself. In this case, “marital satisfaction” would have less to do with the
individual’s satisfaction and more to do with how satisfactory the marriage itself is. Individual
emotionality (satisfaction) is here replaced by moral quality (satisfactory). In fact, many strong
relationists do not believe in a private, subjective sphere of evaluation at all (e.g., Gergen, 2009).
Because this evaluation is relational, and thus shared, the criteria of evaluation are moral or
ethical criteria about the quality of a good marriage. Evaluation is no longer a personal
preference (with no external criteria) but rather a shared assessment of the common good (with
reference to the criteria of the community). Thus, the items’ focus on happiness and satisfaction
would change to a focus on the good of the marriage, reading, for example, “How good is your
marriage?” rather than “How satisfied are you with your marriage?” (KMS1) and “How good is
your relationship with your husband?” rather than “How satisfied are you with your husband as a
spouse?” (KMS2). In this way, the items would evaluate the relationship as opposed to just the
affect of the individual.
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Role of Context. Emphasizing positive affect as a key indicator of the good marriage also
tends to remove the marriage from its context, another key indication of weak relationality. This
can be demonstrated by considering not just how positive affect is viewed, but also negative
affect. Consider the several negatively scored items in the DAS, the EMS, and the MSI.
Examples include DAS22, which asks “How often do you and your mate ‘get on each other’s
nerves,’” EMS8, which reads “I am unhappy about our financial position and the way we make
financial decisions,” and MSI53, which reads “Our relationship has been disappointing in several
ways.” By scoring these items negatively, it is assumed that the marriage is not only good when
positive affect is pervasive, but it is bad when negative affect is present.
Not all good marriages can be determined simply by considering levels of positive or
negative affect. Consider the couple with the terminally ill husband I mentioned above. In
administering to the husband, the wife might feel quite disappointed about the marriage: that it
has not turned out how it should have, that it is a lot harder than she thought it would be, or that
death might end it soon. But this negative affect (disappointment) could very well indicate the
fact that her marriage is good. The mere fact that she had hopes that it would turn out better
indicate that her relationship with her husband before the illness was at least promising, if not
good. But her disappointment might also evidence her willingness to stay with him and nurture
him, another possible indication of a good marriage. Simply calling “negative affect” bad would
ignore the potential goodness of this particular marriage.
Contrast the universal undesirability of negative affect implied by these items with the
strong relationist’s approach to this particular situation. Rather than de-contextualizing the
relationship, the strong relationist must take the greater context into account and consider
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whether “goodness” is achieved even in the face of disappointment. Were the items based
instead on strong relational assumptions, they would not necessarily cast negative affect in such
a bad light. Indeed, the items would acknowledge that negative affect could be in the best interest
of the marriage, or in the interest of the shared good, which interest is the focus of strong
relationality.
Let us return to the couple above, the wife of which might feel considerable negative
affect given the context of her marriage. If the wife were to respond affirmatively to MSI53
(“Our relationship has been disappointing in several ways”), her response would not
automatically garner a poor score from a strongly relational perspective. Instead, the item might
be followed up with a question that would put her response in context. For example, one might
follow up with items such as “How does your disappointment reflect on the goodness of our
marriage?” or “How does you disappointment contribute to or detract from the moral quality of
your relationship?” These new items are contextually specific for the couple and allow for
negative affect to actually be good for the marriage, or at least indicate to the couple that it arises
because the marriage is good.
Consider another example: EMS8 inquires into how happy one is with one’s financial
situation. If one is unhappy with one’s financial situation, then the individual scores low and
therefore (automatically) has a poorer marriage than one who is happy with their situation. Again,
the item fails to take account of the couple’s context. It is possible that one’s unhappiness
(negative affect) about a financial position may actually be good for the marriage if it leads to a
discussion about change in finances. Indeed, without the negative affect, the marriage might
ultimately founder in financial ruin. Unfortunately, asking simply if one is unhappy about a
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couple’s financial situation will not indicate whether that unhappiness actually indicates a good
marriage – or at least a commitment to the good of the marriage.
EMS8 as it stands assumes a weak relationality, as it de-contextualizes that marriage and
simply assumes that unhappiness about finances will make a marriage worse. But as I said
previously, “happiness” and “goodness” are not necessarily the same thing when it comes to
evaluating marriages. For that reason, the strong relationist is concerned with understanding the
marriage contextually. If a “happy” marriage is to be a part of a strongly relational assessment,
then the examiner must understand the role of that happiness in contributing to or detracting
from the moral quality or shared good of the marriage. This might be done by leaving the item
worded as it is, but would again require following it up with an inquiry into the role that
happiness plays in the goodness of the marriage. These questions would of course depend upon
the particular couple, but might read something like the following: “Does this happiness (or
unhappiness) move you toward a better marriage?” Again, the focus of the strong relationist
would not be on the decontextualized affect, but on the good marriage, to which the affect can –
and should – contribute. In this way, a strong relationality is assumed.
Emphasis on Self. Maintaining positive affect as a key marker of a good marriage also
seems to imply that self-interest is being valued, another indication of weak relationality. The
three items that make up the KMS demonstrate this emphasis, asking “How satisfied are you”
with your marriage, spouse, etc (emphasis added). The focus on the individual seems to imply
not only that positive affect is valued, but also private affect. Asking how satisfied one is with
marriage, as these items do, would make sense from a weakly relational perspective because
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one’s primary concern is the interest of the self, and the marriage is intended to serve one’s
individual interest.
This point is made clearer when one considers the language of the EMS and the MSI,
several items of which ask whether the individual is “pleased,” “happy,” or “satisfied” with
various aspects of the marriage, always inquiring into the individual’s private emotion. For
example, EMS5 reads “I am not happy about our communication,” EMS7 reads “I am very
happy about how we make decisions,” and EMS15 reads “I feel very good about how we
practice religion” (emphasis added in each). Indeed, 12 of the 15 items on the EMS begin with
“I,” followed by the emphasis on affect discussed above. 8 of the 13 affect items on the MSI
combine the emphasis on affect with a focus on the self in a similar way, along with the three
items making up the KMS. The primary concern from the perspective of these items is that the
individual is experiencing good or positive feelings. The interest is in the self, not in the
relationship, a key indicator of weak relationality.
The weak relationality being assumed by these items will be made clearer using the
contrasting relations approach. The focus from a strong relational perspective will again be the
relational quality or moral goodness of the marriage. The strong relationist might therefore
inquire into the goodness of one’s co-actions with the other as a spouse, and whether those
actions are good for the marriage – a relational-interest in contrast to a self-interest. For example,
EMS5 might read “Our communication as a couple is good for the marriage;” likewise, EMS7
might read “How we make decisions is good for the marriage,” and EMS15 might read “How we
practice religion is good for the marriage.” In this way, the items avoid focusing simply on the
self’s interest and focus instead on understanding the quality of the marriage. In this way, the
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items can avoid the weak relational assumptions that exist as a consequence of focusing on
personal, private affect.
One item appears to inquire into relational-interest, a possible exception to weak
relationality. DAS32 asks, “Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about
the future of your relationship?” with the responses ranging from “I want desperately for my
relationship to succeed, and would go to almost any length to see that it does,” through “I want
very much for my relationship to succeed, and will do my fair share to see that it does,” to finally
“My relationship can never succeed, and there is no more I can do to keep the relationship going”
(emphases in original). This set of meanings could be interpreted as either weakly relational or
strongly relational. One could say that the various responses measure how committed the person
is to seeing that the relationship succeeds, which could be interpreted as a strong relational bent –
as relational-interest rather than self-interest. For example, it seems possible for one, in
responding to this item, to be willing to endure “negative affect” for the sake of seeing that the
relationship succeeds. Unfortunately, given the tenor of the other items, and the individualfocused wording of this item, it seems unlikely it would be read this way. In other words, the
surrounding context of this one item is likely to have some bearing on its interpretation. It is also
possible, in other words, that making a relationship “work” means making the relationship into
one that brings the positive affect so coveted in the other items, in which case even in responding
to this item one embraces weakly relational assumptions.
Instrumental or Responsible Relating. So we see that most affect items make weak
relational assumptions, generally through the de-contextualizing of the marriage or by
emphasizing self-interest. One more important point ought to be raised. Recall that in chapter
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two, I discussed instrumentalism as a characteristic of weak relationality. Assuming affect,
particularly personal affect, to be paramount in a good marriage can easily lead one to assume
instrumentalism, as he might begin to believe that the purpose or goal of marriage is to bring him
happiness. In other words, he might see marriage as an instrument, rather than as an end. The
fact that the items in this category place so much emphasis on individual positive affect should
indicate that this particular facet of weak relationality is at least implicit in these items. But we
also see that it is also somewhat explicit.
Consider EMS9, which reads “I have some needs not being met by our relationship”
(emphasis added). Wording the item in this way implies that the relationship ought to meet
individual needs. That this item is scored lower when responded to affirmatively suggests that
the individual’s needs are valued above the needs of the relationship. The strong relationist
would not be so concerned about the needs of the individual being met as the needs of the
relationship, wording this particular item something like, “I am not meeting the needs of my
relationship” or “The needs of the relationship are not being met,” with affirmation yielding a
worse score. Instead, an instrumental language is being used, making marriage not the end, but
instead an instrument in the service of the individual, thus assuming a weak relationality.
Consider also MAT1, which when inquiring into the happiness of the individual’s
marriage, it asks the examinee to reply in the context of the happiness that most people “get from
marriage” (emphasis added). This particular item is scored by far the highest among all items on
the MAT (see Table 4), emphasizing not just that individual positive affect is highly valued, but
also suggesting that marriage should above all be instrumental in achieving that affect (one ought
to get happiness from marriage).
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In contrast to the instrumentalism characteristic of a weak relationality, the strong
relationist would be in favor of what was labeled in Chapter 2 responsible relating. From a
strong relationality, one who has chosen to marry has simultaneously chosen to accept certain
responsibilities associated with the good marriage, such as a commitment to the shared good,
involving obligations to the culture and community wherein the marriage exists. Those
responsibilities should mean putting the marriage before one’s self-interest; that is, seeing the
shared good of the marriage as the end, rather than the other way around. This is responsible
relating. None of the items mentioned above seem to understand marriage in this way; instead, if
any obligations are implied by the items above, they seem to be only to one’s own happiness or
satisfaction.
Using a contrasting relations approach, then, the items would need to value the good
marriage as an end, not a means. Any “needs” not being met are of concern to the strong
relationist if they are primarily needs of the marriage, explaining the rewording of EMS9 to “The
needs of the relationship are not being met.” Even more importantly, though, understanding
whether a marriage is characterized by responsible relating necessitates first an understanding of
the moral quality of the relationship. That is, there must be some way to first understand what the
good marriage is, particular to the couple’s context. Only with this understanding can the strong
relationist presume to know how to evaluate the goodness or badness of any particular marriage.
Conclusion. Other than one unlikely exception (DAS32), the items in this category are
clearly based on the weakly relational characteristics I identified in Chapter 2. Indeed, the four
meanings implied by the items composing the affect category overwhelmingly point to all three
characteristics mentioned in Chapter Two: atomism, implied by the focus on affect and the de-
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contextualizing of the relationship; the emphasis on personal, positive affect evidences selfinterest; and seeing marriage as a means to an individual end is explicitly instrumental.
Underlain with weakly relational assumptions, we can conclude that these items do not
avoid individualism. Indeed, the individualism expressed by the wording and scoring of these
items seems quite obvious. As I argued in Chapter Two, self-interest was the epitome of
individualism, putting the individual above all else. Instrumentalism follows closely behind, as it
parallels the utilitarian – and even the expressive – individualism discussed by Bellah and
colleagues (1996). Even atomism assumes the fundamental autonomy of the individual, another
key characteristic of individualism. A strongly relational approach would necessitate the
overturning of all three of these assumptions, demanding first an understanding of the shared
good of the marriage.
Cognition
The second category of items is called “Cognition” because each deals at some level with
thoughts, ideas, or beliefs. As we will see below, the bulk of this category is made up of items
that deal with a couple’s agreement on these thoughts and beliefs. Other items deal with thoughts
and beliefs about the relationship that are either supposed to be good or bad for the relationship.
Cognition items make up another large part of the content (see Table 5).
As I did in my analysis of the affect items, I identify here the underlying assumptions or
meanings that seem to drive the inclusion of the various items in this category. During the course
of the analysis, the meanings seemed to group into four themes which emerged specifically from
the data. These themes capture the various emphases on meanings implied by the “Cognition”
items, their wording and their scoring. I develop these four themes below. The first section,
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“Emphasis on Agreement,” deals with the first theme and discusses how agreement is
emphasized through the wording and scoring of the items. The second section is devoted to the
second theme, “Agreement and the Role of Context,” wherein I discuss how the items deal with
the context of agreement and disagreement in marriage. In the third, called “The Couple in
Context,” I discuss the meaning of the context for the couples assumed by these items. And
finally, the section entitled “Cognitive Appraisals and the Good,” I deal with the items that
presume to make cognitive appraisals, discussing what “good” and “bad” appraisals mean for the
cognition items.
Emphasis on Agreement. In these items, there is a significant emphasis on agreement. For
example, for items 2 through 9 on the MAT (8 of the 15), examinees are asked to “State the
approximate extent of agreement or disagreement between you and your mate on the following
items.” Then follows different matters for which agreement is seen to be important in marriage,
at least from the perspective of the measure, such as “Handling family finances” (MAT2), “Sex
relations” (MAT6), or “Philosophy of life” (MAT8; see Table 4). The DAS has a similar section
(the first 15 of the 32 items) devoted to agreement, quite similar in content, but adding other
items on which couple’s ought to agree, such as “Religious matters” (DAS3), “Aims, goals, and
things believed important” (DAS10), and “Leisure time interests and activities” (DAS14; see
Table 4). On all of these items, individuals score higher the more that they agree with their
spouse. And as the couples score higher, their marriage is said to be better, thus demonstrating
that agreement (at least on these issues) is valued over disagreement.
The emphasis on agreement in this category appears to point fairly strongly to a weak
relationality. As I stated in Chapter 2, because of the atomistic assumptions of a weak
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relationality, relationships must be created. No relationships exist already or naturally, so the
only (or perhaps the best) way relationships can be built is thought to be through agreement, or
agreement of internalized abstractions. Recall that a weak relationality is also called
abstractionist ontology, because abstractions are the most fundamental. Indeed, as I stated in
Chapter 2, abstractions are themselves dependent upon similarities, as they essentially unify all
that is similar from a set of particularities. Relationships from a weak relationality occur only
where these similarities occur. Thus it follows that a weak relationality would focus on a
couple’s similarities, indeed their atomized similarities, or how often they agree on specific
abstractions.
Contrast this with the strong relationist approach, where relationships are fundamental.
Because relationships are not created, but always and already exist, we can assume that any
similarity and any difference we observe is part of that relationship. Thus it would be important
for the strong relationist to understand both where the couple agrees and where they disagree. If
a marital researcher were to just focus on where a couple agreed, and the couple has significant –
even substantial – disagreements that were ignored or glossed over, the researcher could hardly
claim to understand the whole of the marriage. The strong relationist’s understanding of marriage
is in this way more holistic, avoiding as much as possible the atomistic understanding of the
weak relationist.
One way in which the strong relationist could do this would be to change how these items
are scored. Instead of merely scoring the items better for more agreement, the scoring would
need to be more open. For example, the items might provide space for the couple to respond
about their experiences agreeing and disagreeing. For example, in responding to DAS3, which
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inquires into agreement about “Religious Matters,” a couple might answer that they agree
sometimes and disagree sometimes. The open scoring would allow for the couple to elaborate
both the agreement and disagreement on religious matters, enabling the researcher to better
understand the context – the whole – of the agreement and disagreement. In this way, the
evaluator can get a more holistic picture of the relationship, and how similarities and differences
constitute the relationship.
The trend of most of the items in this category is to emphasize agreement and, through
ignoring it, to deemphasize disagreement. As I have argued, the weak relationist argues that
agreement is the foundation of relationship and disagreement is more of a threat to marriage.
Thus in emphasizing agreement and ignoring disagreement, these items are based on a weak
relationality.
Agreement and the Role of Context. The role that context plays in these items is also
revealed by looking at the agreement items. Consider MAT10, which states “When
disagreements arise, they usually result in: husband giving in (scored as 0), wife giving in
(scored as 2), agreement by mutual give and take (scored as 10).” There is no mention of the
context of the disagreement (or the “agreement by mutual give and take,” for that matter);
instead, agreement – no matter the context – is the better end of a disagreement. Similarly,
MSI61 states “My partner and I seldom have major disagreements,” and is scored better when
answered affirmatively. It is impossible, at least from the perspective of these two items, for
disagreement to actually be good for the marriage.
But as I argued in Chapter Two, some agreements can be detrimental to the marriage,
while some disagreements are not necessarily harmful for marriage. For example, agreeing to a
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divorce, where “mutual give and take” epitomizes the distribution of material goods among the
divorcees, would score a 10 on MAT10, but that agreement might be bad for the marriage
(indeed, it might well end the marriage, often the mark of a failed or poor quality marriage). The
strong relationist is not so much concerned about whether couples agree or disagree more, but
whether their agreements and disagreements are good for the marriage. The context of the
agreement needs to be taken into account before one can say whether it is good or bad for the
marriage. The absence of any mention of context points to abstractionist assumptions in the
formulation of these items.
It may appear that those items mentioned at the beginning of this section are more
context specific (e.g., MAT8 – 15), thus overcoming the problems I raise here. After all, marital
scientists will claim that marriages are not ruined by just any old disagreement. However, even
these seemingly “context specific” items de-contextualize agreement to a large degree. Consider
MAT3 (also DAS2), which asks how often couples agree in their matters of recreation. In one
context, agreeing on matters of recreation might be ideal. For example, a couple might agree on
going to the movies together once a week, a matter of recreation that might bring the couple
together.
In another context, however, disagreeing might be better for the marriage. For example, a
wife might be very musically inclined and wish, as a matter of recreation, to play for a local
symphony; her husband might be somewhat athletic and wish to play softball in a local league. If
the husband is musically inept and the wife has a difficult time throwing a softball, agreeing to
participate together might make both uncomfortable and might even be impossible, a potentially
counterproductive agreement. Similarly, deciding against participating in either of the activities
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might lead one or the other (or both) to spite their spouse, which again might be
counterproductive. On the other hand, it could be that the respective matters of recreation give
each spouse some needed “down time,” which might ultimately be in the best interest of the
marriage. In this case, disagreeing might actually be better for the marriage.
Knowing whether differences and disagreements help or hurt the marriage will depend
upon the context of the disagreement and the moral framework by which that context is judged.
The items are neither worded nor scored in such a way as to take account of this moral
framework. Instead, they simply value agreement as a key indication of a good marriage. Using
the contrasting relations approach to understand this better, the strong relationist would at least
need to take account of the context when asking whether a couple agrees or disagrees. In the
example above, a discussion of recreation would likely be the best way to understand the two
different couples, one of which agrees, the other which disagrees, on matters of recreation.
MAT3, as well as the other items in this category, would need to be more open, enabling the
couples to discuss the context of their agreement and disagreement, as well as encouraging the
couple to consider the relational moral framework and the value of agreement or disagreement
given that context.
By de-contextualizing agreement, the meanings of the cognition items seem again to
imply a weak relationality. In abstracting agreement, the items fail to take into consideration the
moral framework of agreement and disagreement. That is, they fail to consider the moral context
of the couple in placing judgment upon agreement and disagreement.
The Couple in Context. It should also be pointed out that the valuing of (general, abstract)
agreement over disagreement has another important implication: abstracting the couple from the
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context of its family or community. Consider, for example, a couple who both agree on treating
their parents and in-laws with immense disrespect (see DAS9; MAT9). While this agreement
will help to categorize this marriage as a “good” one (because they agree), it is a marriage with
no consideration toward the shared good of the couple’s immediate context: their family.
Likewise, a couple might agree on how to handle the family finances (see DAS1; MAT2) in such
a way as to lead the couple to financial ruin. This is not only a potential threat to the marriage
(see Waite & Gallagher, 2000), but it also a potential threat to the community: the couple’s
children might suffer, debtors might not get paid, and the state welfare system might have to bear
a larger burden as a consequence, thus taking money from the pockets of other people in the
community who may need it as much or more. The marriage, according to the DAS1 or MAT2,
is a “good” marriage, though it seems to act contrary to the interest of any shared good. The
same accusation can be made of almost all these agreement items; couples can agree on their
friends (DAS5; MAT5), their philosophy of life (DAS8; MAT8), conventionalities (DAS7;
MAT7), or career decisions (DAS15), and still neglect or even endanger the shared good of the
community. Showing little concern for the wider social context of the marriage indicates weakly
relational assumptions.
This point can be made clearer by contrasting these meanings with a strongly relational
set of cognitive items. At the outset, the strong relationist is concerned with the moral quality of
the marriage. By virtue of the couple’s relationships to others in their immediate context, the
moral quality of their marriage depends upon the couple’s relationship to their family and
community. The good marriage is a good shared by all community members. Ignoring this
connection and assuming the couple is isolated (or atomized) from the community would be to
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misunderstand the moral framework, and thus misunderstand the good marriage. So when asking
about agreement and disagreement, the strong relationist is not only concerned with the
immediate moral context of the couple, but whether the couple’s agreement and disagreement
contributes to the shared good of the community. An example of how one might do this would be
to reword DAS9 to read “How are your dealings with your in-laws good for marriage?” Likewise,
DAS1 might read, “How is your handling of the finances good or bad for the marriage?”
Notice the open-endedness of the rewritten items. The strong relationist recognizes that
often the definition of the good marriage changes to some degree from couple to couple,
especially when the context or culture of the particular couple is taken into account. Recall that
in Chapter 2, I argued that determining the shared good of the couple necessitated a discussion of
marriage in its moral context. This sort of discussion seems necessary here, before one can
decide which agreements (or disagreements) are good for the relationship, and how. That is,
researchers must first understand what the “good marriage” is for a particular couple, their
community, and their culture before truly characterizing agreements and disagreements as good
or bad. This good must above all be shared – by both the couple and the community. If a
researcher’s goal is to understand, from a strong relationality, whether a marriage is good or bad,
then this sort of a discussion ought to be somehow induced through its items. Otherwise, the
researcher will not know which agreements or disagreements are good or bad for the marriage.
In sum, we see also that the couple is also removed from their particular context, indeed
their moral context. Their agreement or disagreement does not depend upon their moral context,
and this de-contextualizing implies a weak relationality.

91

Cognitive Appraisals and the Good. A final point ought to be made concerning the role of
context and the shared good in assessing marriage. Several items in this category deal primarily
with what one might consider potentially damaging cognitions (EMS6; MSI27, 35, 67, 92 and
101). That is, cognitions that pose a potential threat to the marriage. These items inquire into
differing cognitive appraisals concerning the marriage. Each item is scored such that they each
value strictly those cognitions that reflect the spouse or the relationship positively. For example,
MSI35 states “I have often considered asking my partner to go with me to relationship
counseling.” Answering “True” on this item yields a poor score, implying that thoughts about
pursuing counseling are negative and thus bad for the relationship. But simply making blanket
“positive” or “negative” evaluations about cognitions is assuming a weak relationality, as it again
detaches the cognitions from the context of the relationship.
While it is likely true that these “negative” thoughts might indicate an unsatisfactory
marriage, even marital distress, answering “True” does not mean that the marriage itself is bad.
On the contrary, one who has thoughts about going to counseling might be demonstrating a
commitment to the shared good, in which case answering true might indicate a good marriage.
Reaching out to others in the community for help might also indicate that the couple sees their
marriage as bigger than just themselves, seeing it as part of the larger context. But again,
knowing whether a “True” answer indicates this commitment to the shared good requires first an
understanding of the shared good, which understanding this item does not inquire into. And
indeed, such is the case for the remainder of these “negative cognition” questions: to classify a
cognition as “negative” is to assume it is negative in all circumstances, which is to essentially to
neglect the context of those circumstances.
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If we are to contrast the items as they are with how the items would be had a strong
relationality been assumed, then we would see the items written or scored somewhat differently.
For instance, MSI35 might still read the same, but the scoring would be open rather than closed.
That is, an affirmative response would not be a priori considered negative, but would be
followed up by an inquiry into why counseling had been considered. In responding to “why,” a
couple can reveal the context of the desire for counseling and a discussion can follow about how
good or bad that consideration is for the marriage. While I have mentioned it previously, it bears
repeating: from a strongly relational perspective, one needs to first have an understanding of the
shared good or morality of the particular marriage before we can possibly decide whether these
cognitions are truly negative. Rephrasing the items, or opening up the scoring as I suggest above,
is one way to avoid the weak relationality being assumed by these particular “Cognition” items.
Thus we see that even these items that make cognitive appraisals do not avoid weak
relationality, primarily because they make assumptions about a moral framework that applies to
all couples, instead of a contextual morality that would change from couple to couple.
Conclusion. The four meanings identified in this category – the emphasis on agreement,
agreement and role of context, the couple in context, and cognitive appraisals and the good –
point to a weak relationality. Specifically, they seem to capitalize on atomism by abstracting
individuals from one another and from their context, as well as abstracting couples as a dyadic
unit from their context. Consequently, these items also fail to avoid individualism. Indeed,
focusing on individual cognitions is itself a form of individualism, as it assumes the autonomy of
the individual.
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But we also see here that individual couples are also considered independent of the
context, or of the shared good. While it seems the couples are being considered a single unit, the
removal from context follows from individualistic assumptions (Bellah et al., 1996). One
consequence of this de-contextualization is the isolation of couples “from the mass” of its
community, which Bellah and colleagues argue is just as dangerous as liberal individualism (p.
112). Thus, ignoring the context as these items do fails once again to move away from
individualism.
Behavior
The final category of self-report items deals with measures of behaviors associated with
good or bad marriages. That is, they purport to measure various behaviors manifested by the
couple. For example, a couple of behavior items inquire into steps taken toward ending the
marriage, whereas others inquire into behaviors in which the couple has engaged together. These
items make up a minority of items, most of which come from the DAS, with three items from
the MAT and one item from MSI (see Table 5). Consequently, the ontological analysis of these
items is considerably reduced over the previous two.
In analyzing these few items, the meanings of the items seemed to imply only a single
theme, under which all of the behavior items fit. I have entitled the theme “Behavior and the
Good.” As we will see, the behavior items make assumptions about behaviors that are good for
marriage and those that are bad. The question I address in the brief section is this: Is the good
implied by these items one that appears to make weakly or strongly relational assumptions?
Behavior and the Good. The most frequent questions in this category are what I would
call togetherness items; that is, items that inquire into how much time is spent together or
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whether certain activities are completed together. They range from abstract, such as DAS24,
which reads “Do you and your mate engage in outside interests together?” to more concrete, such
as DAS23, which reads “Do you kiss your mate?” For both of these items (as well as the other
behavior items) the couple scores better when engaging in the behaviors selected. Here again, a
weak relationality is being assumed, as the specific behaviors selected (like the cognitions) are
considered positive with no regard to the context.
Behaviors such as engaging in outside interests together or kissing may or may not
indicate whether the marriage is good. The couple mentioned in the above section who engaged
in different outside interests (softball and symphony) might have a good marriage, as I argued,
though they might answer this item negatively. Similarly, another couple may kiss often but be
so wrapped up in one another that they fail to acknowledge the whole, or the community, of
which they are a part and neglect the shared good of the community, thus living in what a strong
relationist might call a poor marriage.
Given the emphasis on contextuality in a strong relationality, it is difficult to make any
general claims about marital quality such as those implied by these items. Instead, questions of
which behaviors characterize a good or bad marriage would arise for the strong relationist only
after the “good marriage” of a couple is considered, and/or when the moral context of the
marriage is properly understood. That would mean understanding, for instance, that engaging in
differing outside interests for one couple might actually be good for the marriage, while for
others it might be harmful. Likewise, it would mean that understanding that kissing often, while
a behavior often indicating good marriages, might occasionally indicate a weakness in the
marriage of some. As I have repeated in the past two sections, the strong relationist will seek to
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understand the couple’s moral framework before they decide which behaviors will characterize
the good marriage and which the bad. The items in the category fail to push for any such
understanding, and consequently the behaviors are de-contextualized and imply a weak
relationality.
Conclusion. As with the affect items and the cognition items, the behavior items also
make weakly relational assumptions. Again, it is the main feature of abstractionism—the
presumed acontextuality of the behavior—that indicates these assumptions. But as I allude to
above, once the moral context of the couple is considered, the strong relationist might be able to
make use of these behavioral items. If, for example, one understands certain behaviors as
characterizing a couple’s particular good marriage (assuming this is understood) then these items
could be used as a way to detect those behaviors Indeed, something similar can be argued for
many of the self-report items analyzed in this larger section here. I will discuss the strong
relationist’s potential use of these items in the next chapter. Suffice it to say, as they stand now –
with no inquiry into the context of the marriage – the behavior items – as well as the affect and
cognition items – overwhelmingly point to a weak relationality.
Behavioral Observation Content
This next section deals with the content of the Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF)
and the Marital Interaction Coding System (MICS), both behavioral observation coding systems.
By coding systems, I mean a system of codes used to categorize behaviors observed by trained
coders. In other words, using this measure requires that coders observe couples interacting,
identifying the various behaviors manifested by couples and matching each with a specific code.
As couples are not directly questioned by these measures, the content analyzed here consists of
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the behaviors making up the coding systems; that is, those behaviors used by coders to categorize
marriages. As with the self-report items, this analysis also includes the scoring, or coding, of the
behaviors.
As we will see below, the content for these two measures is presented much differently
than the self-report content. Consequently, the analysis is a little different, as I describe. In
performing the analysis observation content, the content again seemed to gather under a single
theme, which is called “Behaviors and Context.” As the title of the theme suggests the analysis
deals with the role of context in behavioral observation. The meanings underlying the
observation content all seemed to fit singularly under this one theme.
Behaviors and Context. Both the SPAFF and the MICS use behavioral observation to
determine whether marriages are good or bad. Each measure codes for many different types of
behaviors. In particular, the SPAFF codes “emotional communication in any interaction over
time” and is used to determine whether couple’s interactions are positive, negative, or neutral
based on the type of affect which each person expresses in a particular interaction (Yoshimoto,
Shapiro, O’Brien, & Gottman, 2005, p. 371). Similarly, the MICS codes “behavioral difference
between distressed and non-distressed couples” (Heyman, Weiss, & Eddy, 1995, p. 737),
classifying those behaviors associated with distressed couples as negative and those behaviors
associated with non-distressed couples as positive.
In developing the observational measures, scholars relied primarily upon self-report
measures (e.g., Heyman, Weiss, & Eddy, 1995; Gottman, 1994). The basic procedure including
administering self-report measures – including particularly the MAT (see Waldinger, Hauser,
Schulz, Allen, & Crowell, 2004; Gottman, 1999) to first determine whether a marriage was
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distressed or not. Then the researchers would catalog behaviors of distressed couples and of nondistressed couples. What has resulted from the development of these coding systems are classes,
or codes, said to characterize certain behaviors in marriage as positive or negative. The content
of these measures, then, are the specific behaviors being coded; the scoring is the coding itself,
which can be either positive, negative, or neutral. Where the positive behaviors outnumber the
negative behaviors (sometimes based on a ratio; see Driver & Gottman, 2004), the marriage is
considered good; where the opposite occurs, the marriage is considered bad.
The behaviors used in both the SPAFF and the MICS are those categorized as positive or
negative given previous investigation. Now they have been determined, researchers assume –
prior to observing any particular marriage – which behaviors observed in any particular couple
will be positive or negative. The decision to characterize behaviors does not depend on the
context of the particular couple, but on an ideal abstracted from previously investigated
marriages of which behaviors should or should not be expressed in marriage. For example,
researchers in developing both sets of codes decided that criticism is a negative behavior, and
that humor is a positive behavior. Now, when employing the measures, any observed criticism is
considered negative, regardless of the context; likewise, humor is considered positive, no matter
the context.
That behaviors cannot be coded any differently, given particular contexts, implies a weak
relationality. Take, for example, defensiveness – which Gottman (1999) argues is, universally,
one of the “most corrosive” behaviors in marriage (p. 41). He defines defensiveness as “any
attempt to defend oneself from a perceived attack” (p. 42). Without taking the relational context
into account however, one can never be absolutely sure if defensiveness really is corrosive.
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Consider a context where a husband is being verbally attacked by his wife, who believes he is
having an affair. Attempts to defend his self could seem quite in order if the attack is
unwarranted, and in fact his lack of defensiveness might even make him seem guilty. But these
behavioral measures cannot account for the context of the defensiveness, so that even in this case,
the behavior itself will be considered “negative,” or bad. Instead of judging the goodness or
badness of the behavior – or the morality of the behavior – contextually, a morality is assumed
by determining negativity or positivity before actually observing the behaviors. This sort of
universal morality – one that cuts across all behavioral contexts – is a sign of weak relationality,
taking no account of context.
Contrast the above approach with a strong relational approach. One would not necessarily
assign a morality to certain observed behaviors without first considering the moral context of the
couple. That is, prior to determining whether behaviors are positive or negative, one would have
to have an idea of the couple’s particular good marriage. That sort of understanding might
include, for example, a discussion of the defensiveness itself – or lack thereof – and whether it is
good for the marriage. In our example, the wife might reveal that she never truly suspected her
husband of an affair, wished only to seek some sort of validation, and failed to receive it when
her husband failed to be defensive, and only then became truly suspicious. Thus, it might be that,
in this case, we ought to see defensiveness as a positive behavior. From a strong relational
perspective, moral judgment can come accurately only in the context of the marital good.
Conclusion. As we see, the content of both the SPAFF and the MICS imply a weakly
relational approach to understanding marriage. Both do so by suggesting a morality that cuts
across all particular marriages and take the moral context of the couple into account. While it is
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likely true that behaviors such as defensiveness is often bad for marriage, it is possible from a
strong relationality that defensiveness – or any behavior for that matter – will be either good or
bad based on the context. But as I have already said, the coding of behaviors for both of these
measures does not allow for the context to help constitute the good or bad marriage. Instead, the
good or bad marriage is determined before observations of the marriage even occurs and are thus
underlain with weakly relational assumptions.
Content Analysis Summary
To summarize the content analysis, in the case of both self-report and behavioral
observation measures, a weak relationality is being assumed almost without exception. Let us
just run through the various sections one by one and discuss the themes as they arose in the data,
beginning with the self-report measures and ending with the behavioral observation measures.
From the self-report measures arose three larger themes, each of which could be divided
into smaller themes. The first large theme was “Affect.” Under this theme I analyzed all selfreport items that seemed to emphasize emotions and feelings. In the first sub-theme, “How
Affect is Emphasized,” we saw that the particular affect emphasized is personal as opposed to
relational. In the second sub-theme, “Role of Context,” we saw that the items de-contextualized
affect, another trait of weak relationality. The third sub-theme, “Emphasis on Self,” showed how
the self is emphasized above the marriage for the “Affect” items. The final sub-theme in this
section, “Instrumental or Responsible Relating,” demonstrated that the meanings of these items
implied an instrumental view on relating, as opposed to the strong relational “responsible
relating.”
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The second large theme dealt with in the self-report measures was “Cognition,” where I
analyzed all the items dealing with beliefs or thoughts. This theme was also divided into four
sub-themes. In the first, “Emphasis on Agreement,” I argued that the manner in which agreement
was favored over disagreement implies weakly relational assumptions. In the second sub-theme,
“Agreement and Context,” I argued that these agreements being favored by the items was an
agreement that is de-contextualized, again implying a weak relationality. The third, “Couple in
Context,” showed that the meanings of the items strongly suggested a weak relationality in the
way in which the meanings implied a couple detached from the larger moral context of family
and community. And finally, under the fourth sub-theme, “Cognitive Appraisals and the Good,”
I argued that many of the “Cognition” items suggest that certain appraisals ought to be made of
the marriage regardless of context, again de-contextualizing the couple and suggesting weakly
relational assumptions.
The final large theme of the self-content items was entitled “Behavior,” dealing
specifically with the items that purported to measure behavior. Only one sub-theme emerged in
the analysis of these items, under which all of the few items in the category fit. Entitled
“Behavior and the Good,” this theme dealt with the manner in which behaviors were judged
according to the items’ wording and scoring. I argued here that behaviors are judged to be
positive (good) or negative (bad) regardless of the context. In my analysis of the behavioral
observation analysis, I came to a similar conclusion – under the theme entitled “Behavior and
Context” – where I argued that coding behaviors as positive or negative, regardless of the context,
assumed a weak relationality.
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But content alone does not reveal everything about a measure. Indeed, I have already
mentioned that the strong relationist could use some of this content in their assessment of
marriage, provided they use it contextually. Consequently, we need to analyze its use in order to
determine whether the measures can in some way avoid individualistic assumptions. It is the use
of the measures to which we turn next.
Process Analysis
I have divided the use of the measures into two sections. This first deals with the process
of the items. As I stated above, process refers to the manner in which the measures should be
administered. That is, how researchers are instructed to administer the measures. As with the
section above, this is also divided into two subsections. In the first part, I deal exclusively with
the process of the five self-report measures; in the second, I deal exclusively with the process of
the behavioral measures.
Self-report Process
As I performed the analysis of the self-report process, it became clear that there is little
difference in administration among the various self-report measures (cf. Snyder, 2004; Fowers &
Olson, 1993; Schumm, et al., 1986; Spanier, 1976; Locke & Wallace, 1959). Consequently, this
analysis is for the most part a general analysis of self-report process, at least insofar as the
generalities are applicable to the measures. Where each of the measures varies, I also include a
discussion of these differences, in each case mentioning the measure and the difference, as well
as analyzing the difference for weak or strong relational assumptions.
In performing the analysis of the self-report measures, two main themes emerged
concerning the process of administration, each of which I explore below. The first theme is
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called “Assumptions about the Self.” Under that heading, I deal with the meaning of the self as
implied by the general instructions regarding administering the various self-report scales. The
second theme I identified I have entitled “Assumptions about the Couple” and under this theme, I
explore meanings associated with how couples are assumed to be understood.
Before I continue, I should make a note on the references. In performing this analysis, I
drew heavily upon literature for all five measures. Where the analysis is general (that is, where I
refer to all five measures at once), this means that the list of references is at times quite extensive.
For the sake of space, I do not list references in the text where the analysis is general. Instead, I
have distinguished these studies from the other references by marking each with an asterisk in
the reference section. Otherwise, I only list specific references in the text when I discuss a
particularity about just one measure.
Assumptions about the Self
One of the most striking things to note about the process of “self-report” measures is
what exactly “self-report” means. Without prior knowledge of psychometrics, one might
consider the term “self-report” and guess that it implies an open-ended response to the subject
matter, in this case marriage, allowing the self to report whatever seems applicable concerning
the well-being of the marriage. In other words, if one is trying to measure the quality of a marital
relationship, hearing “self-report” might lead the uninitiated to expect a lot of latitude in his or
her response to the assessment. This is, of course, not the case for self-report measures. Instead,
the individual is expected to respond to a series of pre-determined questions concerning the
subject, and in the case of those measures being analyzed here, can only respond using predetermined answers. This is not uncommon for self-report measures; but as this is characteristic
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of all five self-report measures, it is important to understand what assumptions underlie this
particular practice.
First of all, simply replying to the items’ pre-determined answers requires that one
abstract oneself from one’s context and ignore parts of the context that do not fit the items. The
only other real option is to skip the item. Take as an example the MSI, which consists entirely of
true/false items. It seems quite obvious that, contextually, few things are ever true or false all the
time. One might feel that even responding to any one item might misrepresent the relationship.
As I point out in the previous section, the items themselves make assumptions and the couple
may not make those same assumptions, and thus may not even wish to respond to certain items.
As for the process, though, whether the items appropriately represent the couple or not
seems to be irrelevant. Individuals taking the MSI are required to reduce their contextual
experience down to either true or false. Snyder (2004), the creator of the measure, instructs that
even if one is reluctant to give “simple ‘true’ or ‘false’ responses,” the administrator is still to
“discourage them from skipping any inventory items…[and instead encourage] examinees to
mark the responses that come closest to describing their feelings” (p. 7, emphasis added). In
other words, rather than allow one to consider the whole of one’s context in responding (or not
responding) to the quality of one’s marriage, one ought instead to reduce one’s experience down
to a single, acontextual response that fits the measure. Cutting out the context of a couple’s
responses in attempting to understand the marriage is a sign of weak relationality.
We can use a contrasting relations approach to see this point a little clearer. Instead of
requiring a couple to stick to either true or false, the strong relationist would be willing to open
up the response to items on the MSI in such a way as to allow the couple to speak to the context.
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The strong relationist would argue that understanding a marriage would require understanding
the couple’s feelings about the marriage, not the best approximation. For instance, if a couple
were to claim that answering either “True” or “False” does not adequately describe their feelings,
rather that encouraging the couple to “mark the response that comes closest,” the strong
relationist would be interesting in understanding why the dichotomous responses are insufficient.
Otherwise, the strong relationist would argue, the relationship cannot be completely understood.
In order for the MSI to be open to strongly relational assumptions, its process would have to
open up to allow this sort of response.
Of course, dichotomous items make only a limited appearance in the other measures,
which use primarily Likert scale type items. In employing the Likert scale, a little more latitude
is allowed in responding “contextually” (i.e., couple’s do not have to limit their responses to
either/or). But this concession is a small one considering the limitations placed on the individual
by the items themselves. We have already seen that the content of the measures is based on weak
relational assumptions. If the content analysis proves correct, then when responding to these selfreport items, one has no choice but to represent oneself according to the assumptions made by
the items; that is, as an atomized, self-interested individual. For example, one being administered
the KMS can only respond that they are either satisfied or dissatisfied with their marriage, their
spouse, and their relationship; they cannot respond, assuming this to sometimes be case, that
being satisfied is not as important to them as whether they are successfully satisfying their
spouse. Constructing a “self-report” measure in this way places limitations on how one can
present the self, effectively de-contextualizing the “self” and therefore implying a weak
relationality.
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A brief example might further illuminate the weak relationality that manifests itself in
administering the items as they stand. Consider a man who has just lost a child. It is quite
possible that he feels a great deal of grief day by day. If asked to take the EMS, it is quite likely
that he would score low, as almost all of these items inquire about affect and assume that positive
affect typifies a good marriage. It is quite possible, however, that his low score is due primarily
to his generally low affect, which might tend to skew his responses. It could legitimately be
argued that this man does not have a poor marriage, but instead has a very healthy marriage. But
the measure cannot take this man’s relationship to his context (i.e., the passing of his child) into
account because of the manner in which it is administered. Administering the EMS as is, with no
adaptation for differing contexts, one misses the richness of this man’s experience and instead of
attending to the fact that he is grieving his lost son, attends to the poor score, which then
translates to a “poor” marriage that may or may not even exist. In other words, administering the
measure as it ought to be puts limitations on how individuals can “self-report,” which fails to
acknowledge the context of the person’s marriage and implies a weak relationality.
Contrast this manner of “self-report” with how a strong relationist might perform a selfreport. For the strong relationist, differences in particular contexts would necessitate a more open
approach to administration. Self-report, from this perspective, would mean to report a self in
context, in particular the moral context. At the least, that would mean allowing the couple to
respond openly to the items in the measures. With this sort of openness, the items might then
merely guide a discussion of the “good” marriage of the couple, and how couples understand
their moral framework. For example, in responding to the KMS, couples would not just note how
satisfied they are on scale of 1 to 7, but would be able to talk about what that satisfaction (or

106

dissatisfaction) means in the context of a their moral framework and whether it indicates the
goodness of their marriage. In this way, the self that is reporting is a contextual self – one that is
perhaps satisfied, perhaps unsatisfied, but sees that satisfaction in relation to the goodness or
badness of his marriage and in the context of the relational whole. If administering the above
measures as they stand, one must do so with this kind of openness if they are to assume strong
relationality.
A final point ought to be made concerning what “self-report” means as implied by the
process of these measures. The instructions of all five self-report measures require that couples
take the measures separate from one another and without collaboration. As Snyder (2004) says
concerning the MSI, responses must be “independent…in order to ensure clinically useful results”
(p. 6). In other words, the self that is reporting the marriage is (or ought to be) autonomous, an
atomized individual, one whose report is not influenced in any way by the other spouse. The
independent manner in which these measures are administered suggests that the individuals are
not bound relationally, but that their relationship can be appropriately represented by each
individual separately. Separating married individuals from one another separates the individuals
from an important part of the context of their marriage – their spouse – and thus is a practice that
tends to de-contextualize the couple, a sign of weak relationality.
From a strong relational perspective, even part of the whole is said to be reflective of the
whole, so administering the measures individually is not necessarily weakly relational. The
strong relationist could justify the separation of married persons given certain contexts. For
example, if a couple is involved in a domestic dispute wherein the pair has been court-ordered to
avoid each other, the strong relationist might argue that one individual by herself will still be
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able to reflect the whole. However, the strong relationist would also hold that seeing a person in
his or her context is better than seeing him or her abstracted from the context, which would
include seeing the couple together. Thus it would not be standard practice from this perspective
to separate the couple. Instead, if both spouses were available, it would make more sense from a
strong relational perspective to assess the couple together – as a whole – as that would be a better
way of seeing the couple in context than separating the two. Indeed, the strong relationist would
argue against the idea that the couple could avoid collaborating, as persons apart from their
spouses are still in relation to their spouses, and thus somewhat influenced by them. Because the
strong relationist argues for a fundamental relationality, it would be impossible for two people in
relation to not collaborate (that is, in some way influence the others’ responses on the measure,
separated or not).
In conclusion, the process of self-report measures implies a definition of self and “selfreport” that makes weakly relational assumptions. The self is autonomous and atomized – also a
characteristic of individualism – and thus is not fundamentally in relation to the spouse. Thus we
see that that the assumptions made about the self in the process of administrating these measures
do not avoid individualism.
Assumptions about the Couple
Once a couple has completed the self-report measure, then their score is totaled and these
scores are then compared to a normative sample, which then indicates whether the couple falls
within a certain category. The categories include well-adjusted/poorly adjusted (e.g., Deleonardo,
1999), distressed/non-distressed (e.g., Whiting & Crane, 2003, which also distinguishes between
moderately and severely distressed), or satisfied/unsatisfied (e.g., McLeland & Sutton, 2005).
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Cut-off scores are the rule for determining which couple to place in which category, and in all
cases the scores have been standardized to create the normative sample and provide a
comparison of scores for couples.
The first issue to address is the scoring itself. All these measures use a numerical score to
summarize the couple’s marriage. Defining a couple by using a number is a decidedly thin way
of representing the couple. By that, I mean to say that the score is contextually bare. For example,
consider one couple who scores a 50 on the MSI (Global Distress Scale) compared to another
who scores 60. One might wonder what the difference between a 50 and a 60 on the MSI might
be. The numbers themselves are fairly barren in helping to make any sort of meaningful
distinction between couples. This barrenness is an indication of weak relationality.
This barrenness is made more evident with the contrasting relations method. From a
strong relationality, understanding a couple requires a contextual understanding. Descriptions of
the couple from this perspective will thus be contextual and “thick.” We might say, for example,
that the couple who scored 50 in the above example are both involved in local politics and lead
rather busy lives, whereas the couple who scored 60 is a retired couple that spend much of their
time vacationing. These differences would change significantly our understanding of each of the
marriages – a difference that is at best poorly reflected by a 10 point numerical difference.
Similarly, numerical scores cannot distinguish between two couples who score the same, though
the differences between these two couples would be essential to how a strong relationist
understands each marriage.
The strong relationist would certainly favor a thicker description of couples, one that
perhaps uses spoken language rather than numerical language. By nature, couples do not speak in
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numbers nor understand their marriage in numbers. Asking the couple to translate their marriage
into numbers does not guarantee that the meanings couples wish to convey are retained
(Williams, 2005). The spoken language of the married couple, however, is inherently rooted in
the couple’s context, and thus is the natural language of understanding. Thus using the spoken
language to understand and evaluate marriage allows for greater contextual complexity, believed
to be fundamental from a strongly relational perspective.
As I mention above, the scores are also standardized. By standardizing the scores, the
creators of the measures have assumed that all good marriages will be the same. That is, they
have generalized their idea of the good marriage, given it a number, and included that number as
part of the scoring for the measures. This is another way to assume a weak relationality. This
general view of marriage – the “norm” – is essentially abstracted from the various contexts of the
particular marriages that make up the normative sample. This practice essentially places the
abstract ideal as a benchmark by which to judge other couples. Thus comparing each couple to a
general, abstracted idea of the good marriage, is to assume that the good marriage depends not on
the couple’s relationship to their particular context, but instead on an abstract ideal. In other
words, scoring and comparing scores as instructed effectively ignores the relational moral
framework of the couple, assuming instead a general, abstracted moral framework determined by
the measure that applies to couples across contexts, and thus assumes weak relationality.
Putting couples into the distressed/non-distressed or well-adjusted/maladjusted categories
is similarly assuming a weak relationality. The categories are themselves abstractions (based on
the normative samples) where the couple is made to fit, depending on how they score on the
measure. The labels are incapable of capturing the contextual complexity of the particular
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couples. Take, for example, a couple that is labeled “distressed.” The label “distressed”
potentially ignores a host of contextual realities, such as moments (even fleeting) when the
couple is actually not distressed, or even the context of the distress (which again, may not be due
to a poor marriage, but to other contextual circumstances). Comparing couples to a normative
sample and then labeling them with an abstraction is assuming a weak relationality.
As I have mentioned several times already, the strong relationist understands the couple
to be deeply contextual, and to thus live in a moral framework that is likewise contextual,
particular to the couple. Any particular couple will have a moral framework that will differ in
some ways from the moral framework of other couples. Thus any “norm” will change from
couple to couple. Indeed, for the strong relationist, norms are themselves inevitably decontextual, as they are defined by abstract characteristics of the relationship that occur regularly
– hence “normal” behaviors – and ignore the irregular behaviors. Norms are essentially a type of
abstraction. Thus normative sampling for the strong relationist can only ever provide an
impoverished view of the couple’s moral context. Indeed, it may even provide the wrong view of
a couple’s moral framework, as “norms” change with the context.
For example, the strong relationist might anticipate “normal” satisfaction to change for a
newlywed couple if they decide to have children. Even if the couple’s so-called level of
satisfaction did not change, it is quite likely the nature of that satisfaction will change. In this
way, the relational context of the couple changes and understanding their marriage requires that
we adjust what we initially considered the “norm” for that couple. Thus using normative
sampling is itself called into question from this perspective, as the strong relationist is
particularly interested in understanding the couple in context. Understanding a couple
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contextually would require noting the changes in the couple’s contexts, effectively altering most
“norms,” which by definition remain static.
Likewise, the couple would need to be understood according to its personal context.
Labels would be rejected and the strong relationist would seek a deep understanding of the
couple in context. For example, a couple who might be categorized as distressed using the MAT
(or another of the measures) might be observed in particular, non-distressed moments. Those
moments might be significant to the researcher and she might then want to explore the context of
those moments and understand why or how the couple changes from one context to the other. In
this manner, the researcher is attentive to the context of the couple and how the couple changes
across differing contexts, and is more likely assuming a strong relationality.
One final point ought to be considered with regard to the self-report measures. The
measures themselves have been formulated to apply universally across all contexts. That is, in
administering the measures, the context rarely, if ever, influences any sort of change, whether in
content or process. One example of where this is most obvious is in cross-cultural research. All
self-report measures are at some point used to measure marriages in other cultures, such as the
Japanese (e.g., Chen, Tanaka, Uji, Hiramura, Shikai, Fujihara, Kitamura, 2007), Czech (Vaculik
& Jedrziejczykova, 2009), Bedouin (Al-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, 2008), Haitian (Felix, 2007),
and Korean (Chung, 2004). For the most part, the measures themselves remained essentially
unchanged in both content and process, apart from the necessary translation that must occur in
some cases. Even with differences through translation, however, the underlying meaning of the
measures remain the same (e.g., the KMS still measures marital satisfaction, even in its use in
other cultures). This particular practice assumes that successful marriages are the same across
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cultures. But even more, it suggests that the measure itself is perceived as unchanging, an
indication of weakly relational assumptions.
Once again, turning to a strong relational perspective, the contrasting relations method
makes this point clearer. Measuring marriage must differ across contexts, as marriages
themselves differ across contexts. Thus for the strong relationist, measures must have the
flexibility to change as contexts change. For example, cross-cultural understandings of marriage
would require an understanding of the specific cultural meaning of marriage. Our instrument
would need to be sensitive to this cultural understanding and factor that into a moral framework
of marriage that could be culture specific. Different contexts will call for different emphases of
good and bad; different cultures will call for differing moral frameworks. Without this sort of
flexibility, the strong relationist would argue, one will fail to properly understand any particular
marriage.
Conclusion
So we see that in the process of scoring the self-report measures, couples are decontextualized by the self-report measures, because they are both categorized and compared to a
normative sample. As we see above, the self also is de-contextualized in the implied definition of
self-report. Both themes which arose from the self-report process then seem to manifest weakly
relational assumptions.
Behavioral Observation Process
Like the self-report measures, the process of both the MICS and the SPAFF is similar.
Consequently, the following analysis will cover both the MICS and the SPAFF collectively,
except where notable exceptions arise. In my analysis of behavioral observation process, a single
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theme emerged, which I call “Couple and Context.” As the title suggests, this theme deals with
the degree to which the couples are understood contextually, given the process of the measures.
It appears the whole of process fits under this single theme. For organizational purposes, I have
divided this theme into two parts, the first dealing with “Couple and Context” in the
administration of the measure; the second with “Couple and Context” in the coding and scoring.
Couple in Context
Administration. The first step in coding interaction behavior of couples is to get the
couple to interact. This is generally performed by having the couple generate a list of conflictual
areas and then choose one to discuss for 10-15 minutes (see for example Heyman, Weiss, &
Eddy, 1995 and Shapiro, 2004). The purpose of doing this type of interaction is to try to
reproduce as close as possible a natural interaction between the couple. The couple is then
allowed to interact with no intervention for 10-15 minutes. Their interaction is videotaped for
later analysis by coders, explained below.
At first blush it seems that in employing this measure, one is more attuned to the context
of the couple. Rather than contriving an abstract scenario wherein couples can interact,
researchers help the couple contrive their own scenario based on their own particular context.
One specific way researchers have employed the SPAFF has been used by Gottman and his
students (e.g., Driver, 2006), where the couple actually spends 24 hours in an apartmentlaboratory, equipped with all the amenities you might find at home, such as a kitchen, a living
area, and a bedroom. The apartment is meant to represent a home-like environment and
theoretically enable the couple to behave as naturally as possible. The couple is generally

114

observed (by video camera) for 12 hours out of the day and then the analysis is performed on a
10 minute segment of that day.
Using a contrasting relations approach, we can better understand the strong relationality
implied here. As I have mentioned, the weak relationist tends to feel a little more ambivalent
about the context of the couple. The sort of attentiveness being paid to the couple’s context here
seems more characteristic of a strong relationist. Indeed, if we are to learn anything about the
analysis to this point, it is that the weak relationist consistently attempts to fit couples with a
universal context. Thus we might expect that a weak relationist would encourage couples to have
the same or similar discussion as other couples, rather than letting them choose a scenario more
typical of their relationship. But that is not what happens here, implying strongly relational
assumptions.
It seems, however, that strong relationality is partnered with weak relationality in this
particular form of administration. The analyzed interaction is fairly short – 10-15 minutes – and
is abstracted from the greater context of the relationship and said to represent the relationship.
The goal of these measures is to understand the marriage, however understanding such a short
period will potentially ignore rather important parts of the greater context of the marriage. Indeed,
by limiting the time of the discussion, couples are only allowed to introduce a small part of their
context to the researchers, and thus the observations miss a host of other contexts that might be
important for understanding the couple’s marriage. For example, though a couple’s discussion of
their children might mirror a discussion of religion, both conversations will certainly have
differences to which this particular process is unable to attend.
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The strong relationist will concede that any 10-15 minute part of a marriage will in many
respects reflect the whole of the marriage (Yanchar, 2005). The more “natural” that the 10-15
minute discussion, the better for the strong relationist. But understanding marriage for the strong
relationist requires attention to a greater context wherein that part is situated, when and where it
can be made available. Indeed, the strong relationist might argue that a discussion of 10-15
minutes would likely not include important parts of the marriage that might be necessary for a
full understanding of the marriage. Thus from this perspective, observations would likely take
place over longer periods of time, and even across several differing contexts.
As it stands, then, the administration of the SPAFF or the MICS seems to imply both
strong relationality – in its call for more “natural” (contextual) interactions – and weak
relationality – in its temporal and spatial limitation of the context of interaction. It might even be
that the strong relational move has been an attempt to correct for the generally acontextual nature
of self-report measures. Whether it is or not, it appears it has not entirely avoided a weak
relationality.
Scoring. After the interaction has been videotaped, it is then observed and analyzed by
coders. Before coders analyze the videos, they are trained to recognize certain verbal, facial or
physical cues that would indicate the various types of behavioral or affective expression. Coders
then look at the behavioral expression of each person in the couple at various intervals (e.g.,
every time the speaker or the topic changes, or every 30 seconds, etc; e.g., Fyffe, 2000), keeping
frequency counts of the different coded behaviors. The frequency counts are then added to make
a summary score, which is then compared to a normative sample, much like self-report scores.
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The codes for both the MICS and the SPAFF are universal and almost any behavior
manifested by any individual in any interaction should fit one of the codes. I discussed in a
previous section the universal morality (and therefore weak relationality) implied by the codes
themselves. That coders are required to fit couples to the codes, rather than to fit codes to the
couples, also implies a weak relationality. In other words, only when couples fit the abstracted
moral good implied by the so-called “positive” behaviors can it be concluded that their marriage
is good. This assumes a weak relationality because the tendency is to focus not on the couple’s
relationship and a relational moral framework, but to assume that a pre-determined, abstract
moral framework ought to legislate whether the couple’s marriage is good.
One major exception to this universal rule of coded behavior can be seen in the process of
the SPAFF. Gottman (the author of the SPAFF) believes that most affective expressions are
universal across cultures, referencing researcher Paul Ekman, famous for his work studying
facial expressions across cultures (Yoshimoto, Shapiro, O’Brien, & Gottman, 2005). This belief
itself implies weak relationality. However, in the scoring instructions for the SPAFF, Gottman
and his colleagues allow for cultural anomalies – culture-specific behaviors that may not fit the
universal codes identified in the SPAFF. All coders are therefore supposed to be “cultural
informants,” able to identify affects that are specific to the culture in which the SPAFF is being
administered and coded (Shapiro, 2004).
The idea of a “cultural informant” is more strongly than weakly relational. The weak
relationist is more interested in the universal good marriage, often arguing (as Ekman might) that
the good marriage is the same across cultures. But here, we see that instead of forcing individual
behavior into the abstracted, universal mold of the SPAFF codes, having a cultural informant at
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least permits for culturally specific – that is, context specific – behaviors to be noted and play a
role in assessment. This notion at least allows for a strongly relational perspective on marriage,
as it permits the cultural context of the couple speak louder than if it were just otherwise ignored.
Thus two meanings appear to emerge from the scoring of the SPAFF and the MICS. The
first meaning is that coding couple behavior requires that the coder attend primarily to universal
definitions of good and bad and fit each couple to one or the other mold, which meaning is
weakly relational. The second meaning derives from the idea of a “cultural informant,” which
allows for culture-specific behaviors to speak somewhat to coders’ assessment of the couple’s
good or bad marriage. While it appears that the idea of culture-specific, context-dependent
behavioral codes is not emphasized nearly as much as the emphasis coders place on the universal
codes (e.g., Fyffe, 2000; Gottman, 1999), it still stands that both a weak and strong relationality
seem to be potentially present in the scoring.
One final point ought to be made concerning the scoring. Once the coding is complete,
couples are assigned summary scores based the frequency counts of positive and negative
behaviors (e.g., Felbau-Kohn, 2001). Communication sequence scores are also tallied, which
measure how often, for example, a negative behavior is followed by a negative response (Driver
& Gottman, 2004). Ultimately, these scores are used to classify the couples, much like the selfreport scores are used: those with more negative behaviors or negative behavior sequences are
those whose marriages are worse off, and those with more positive behaviors have better
marriages. I have already argued that this process of categorization based on a weak relationality,
but it bears repeating here. Categorizing a couple as “distressed” or “non-distressed” abstracts
the couple from their particular context, ignoring moments or events wherein the couple might
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be rather different. Once a couple is categorized using the scores, the researcher tends to attend
to that label (the abstraction) and ignore the couple, whose context is bound to change. Ignoring
the couple is ignoring the rich context wherein the couple exists, the context to which the strong
relationist must attend if she is to be strongly relational.
Conclusion
The analysis of the behavioral observation process yielded some mixed results. Recall
that the overall theme was entitled “Couple and Context.” We see first with the administration of
the measures, couples are seen more contextually that we have seen up to this point, as they are
asked to engage in a conversation common to their particular marriage. On the other hand, the
conversation itself is somewhat abstracted from the whole context of the marriage, evidencing
more weak relational assumptions. We might draw similar conclusions from the scoring of
behavioral observation methods, as we saw strong relational assumptions in “cultural informant,”
but more weakly relational assumptions as scorers tend to emphasize universal codes of behavior
over culturally specific codes.
Process Analysis Summary
To summarize the process analysis, self-report measures are still overwhelmingly weakly
relational. As I just mentioned, behavioral observation measures seem to be more a mixture of
strong and weak relationality, though the latter is clearly dominant. Let us run briefly through the
various themes of each section one more time to review.
I first analyzed the self-report process, from which arose two themes: “Assumptions
about the Self” and “Assumptions about the Couple.” Under the first theme, I noted that the
process of self-report measures defines self autonomous and atomized, particularly in its implied
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definition of “self-report.” For the second theme, I argued that in the categorization of couples,
and subsequent comparison to normative samples, de-contextualizes the couple and is based on
weakly relational assumptions. Thus the process of self-report is imbued with a weak
relationality.
But while the process of self-report is primarily based on weakly relational assumptions,
the analysis of behavioral observation measures proved to be a little different. The theme that
rose from these measures was entitled “Couple and Context.” Under this theme, I noted that,
while there are still several underlying weak relational assumptions in the process of behavioral
observation, such as is implied by the brief interactions and the scoring summaries, two practices
revealed more strongly relational leanings. First was the quasi-natural settings in which
behavioral observation occurs, where the couple is asked to discuss naturally a topic which
comes up in normal, day-to-day interaction. Second was the cultural informant, who is charged
with noting culture-specific behaviors that might otherwise be missed by the universal behavioral
categories.
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DISCUSSION
I began this dissertation discussing individualism, its pervasiveness in American culture,
and the potential threat that individualism poses for marriage. It has long been contended that
individualism is a big part of our culture, beginning in the nineteenth century with French
philosopher de Tocqueville (2000; see also Bellah et al., 1996). Relatively recent observations
have shown that individualism has become part of the marital culture (e.g., Amato, Booth,
Johnson, & Rogers, 2007; Doherty, 2002). Indeed, some fear that individualism has been
somewhat devastating for marriage in America, leading, for example, to a higher divorce rate
(e.g., Cherlin, 2009; Fowers, 2000).
A few scholars have even contended that individualism has infiltrated the marital
sciences (Fowers, 2000; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). And this particular observation
has some potentially troubling implications, with some scholars fearing that the same problems
individualism causes for marriage have carried over to the discipline charged with caring for
marriage. Among the most troubling implications is the worry that individualistic assumptions in
the marital sciences “may very well heighten the already excessive popular expectations of
marriage, thereby inadvertently helping to maintain or accelerate the rate of divorce”
(Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon,1999, p. 166).
The problem is that there has as yet been no systematic study of the marital sciences to
test this contention. Thus it was this observation that gave birth to this project, as I hoped to
determine if and to what extent individualism was a part of the marital outcome literature, in
particular the methods used to measure marriage. But uncovering individualistic assumptions
seemed a little difficult, given that the measures deal primarily with relationships. Thus, I argued
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that identifying individualistic assumptions would require a deeper analysis of the types of
relationships being assumed by the instruments. By tracing individualism to its ontological roots,
and arguing that even the individualist can talk about relationships, the question, “Do outcome
measures assume individualism?” evolved into, “What types of relationships are being assumed
by the measures: individualistic or relational?” The latter question, I argued, was an ontological
question, as it required understanding the ontological assumptions being made by the instruments.
By now, the reader should be familiar with the two ontological perspectives used to perform this
analysis. Abstractionism, or weak relationality, is the ontology under which individualism is
subsumed; strong relationality is the ontology I used to contrast with abstractionism and
individualism. Each ontology offers a different perspective on relationships and these differing
perspectives became the framework for my analysis of marital outcome measures.
After an exhaustive review of the marital outcome literature, I selected five of the most
prominent and widely used self-report measures and two of the most popular behavioral
observation measures for ontological analysis. I used a contrasting relations approach to analysis,
in which I basically identified the assumptions made in the content and the process of the
measures as either weakly or strongly relational. I then further demonstrated the assumptions
being made by the content or the process by contrasting them with alternative content or
processes based on the alternate ontological assumptions. Through this analysis, I argued that
weak relationality – the relational manifestation of individualism – utterly dominates the
underlying assumptions of all seven measures. Some hints of strong relationality were found, but
its influence was almost trivial in comparison to the weak relationality of all the instruments,
including their content and process. In analyzing the content and process of the measures, all
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three assumptions identified in Chapter 2 as characteristic of a weak relationality – self-interest,
instrumentalism, and atomism – were evident.
First, in the content analysis, self-interest was manifested through the emphasis of the
measures’ items on so-called positive affect over negative affect. The positive affect of the self
trumped all other interests in these items, including, conspicuously, interest in the marriage. That
is, it was more important that the individual feel good about the relationship than that the
interests of the relationship – the actual goodness of the relationship – were served. In fact,
individual positive affect seemed so highly valued that entire measures were primarily composed
with that single meaning in mind. Thus, in measuring whether a marriage was good, items often
inquired first into whether the interests of the self or individual had been served. As I mentioned
in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, self-interest is a potential threat to marriage because it serves
primarily the interests of individuals involved in the marriage, even to the detriment of the
relationship.
In tandem with self-interest, the content analysis revealed instrumentalism as another
prominent assumption. Some of the content which emphasized individual positive affect also
implied that the purpose of marriage was to obtain self-interest, and marriage should thus be
viewed as an instrument or means for achieving positive affect. Instrumentalism was also viewed
as a potential threat to marriage. Both Fowers (2000) and Bellah et al. (1996) discussed this
particular feature of individualism, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, arguing that viewing marriage as
an instrument or means, where individual self-interest is the end goal, can result in divorce,
especially when the self’s interests are not being met.
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Atomism also manifested itself prominently in the analysis of both the content and the
process of the measures. The content analysis showed that the measures atomized the individual.
In discussing affect and cognition, for example, the emotions and thoughts of individuals were
assumed to be personal and private, rather than relational and shared, thus presupposing
individuals to be fundamentally independent of other individuals and the external context. In that
sense, then, the individual’s affect and cognition are contained within the self, fundamentally
uninfluenced by the context outside of the individual, including other individuals (such as a
spouse). In the sections on behaviors, as measured by both self-report and behavioral observation
measures, behaviors were also investigated as though they were independent of other behaviors,
abstracted from the context wherein the behaviors occurred. In this way, behaviors were also
fundamentally atomized from other contextual factors, such as others’ behaviors (including those
of the spouse).
Strong relationality was manifested at only one particular place in the measures, the
process of the behavioral observation measures. Only here was there evidence that perhaps the
context of the couple was being taken seriously in understanding the couple’s marriage. However,
even this small manifestation of strong relationality was de-contextualized in many ways, and
mixed with weakly relational assumptions. For instance, the couple was still removed from their
natural context (such as from their home to the laboratory) and the measure used to analyze
behavior was still imbued with weakly relational assumptions, in particular because it failed to
consider the couple’s community and culture. Thus even this tiny hint of strong relationality is
minimal compared to the otherwise dominate weakly relational assumptions in the discourse of
marital therapy outcome measures.
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Limitations
There were several major limitations associated with the design of this study: (1) only the
more widely used measures were analyzed; (2) two ontological perspectives were drawn on in
the analysis; and (3) the project itself was not empirical in the traditional sense.
First, there are a myriad of measures used by marital researchers and therapists, only
seven of which were analyzed. In this sense, it is fair to say that the results of my analysis may
not apply to all measures currently in use. As I argued in Chapter 3, my purpose was not to do
an exhaustive analysis, but instead to analyze only the most popular of the measures and fairly
assess the hidden relational assumptions of a large portion of the marital research. Of all the
measures I identified in Table 3, those I analyzed received 80% of all hits in the last decade,
representing a large majority of the research reviewed, thus it seems my purpose was
accomplished. But there are many other measures available, including some being newly
developed, so it is important to note that this project has pioneered a new framework of analysis
that can be useful to any researcher wishing to test a measure for its ontological character.
One might also question how exhaustive the two ontologies were in understanding
marital assessment; that is, whether there is not another ontological alternative that ought to have
been considered in such an analysis. As I argued in Chapter 2, however, the two ontologies
described are thought to be comprehensive (Slife, 2005; Macmurray, 1999). The abstractionist
ontology has roots in Greek philosophy, and has influenced most of the modern approaches to
knowledge in the past few centuries in Western culture (Robinson, 1995). Even materialism, a
popular ontology in the natural sciences, as well as some branches of psychology (e.g.,
neuroscience; see Slife & Hopkins, 2005), is a subcategory of abstractionism, with its reductive
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and contextless approach to complex phenomena (Slife and Richardson, 2008). And as I argued
in Chapter 2, the relational ontology is also subsuming, being used as a framework for both the
natural sciences (e.g., Prigogine, 1997) and the social sciences (Reber, 2007; Nelson, 2007). That
it is being used so broadly ought to suggest its exhaustive nature in explaining complex
phenomena, particularly a relational phenomenon such as marriage.
A final objection that might be raised is the project’s seemingly non-experimental nature.
In many respects, this dissertation is somewhat non-traditional, particularly in the field of
psychology. My subject matter was instruments used to measure marriages, not the married
couples themselves; my analysis was dialectical, not mathematical. As a consequence, my
approach and subsequent analysis may be unfamiliar in some senses. But one should keep in
mind that my subject was assumptions, so I needed to perform a conceptual analysis. As such,
the analysis was necessarily theoretical. However, it was also empirical, at least in the broad
sense of that term. My “data” were the marital literature, specifically the instruments used to help
form this literature. These instruments and their practices were observable and themselves
analyzable. And though I did not quantify my observations, I presented the methods and
evidence in such a way that anyone could replicate my study and check my results. The results I
have presented are therefore as open to scrutiny as any empirical research. And it may be that,
after all, conceptual analysis of philosophical assumptions embedded in the instruments used to
gather empirical data is a “pre-empirical chore” that, when attended to, would expand the
meaningfulness of empirical work. Indeed, given the results of this analysis, the “pre-empirical
chore” accomplished by this project is quite revealing of the current instruments and these
instruments can now be better understood for what they are: instruments for measuring
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individuals and their feelings about marriages, not necessarily for measuring the quality of the
marriage relationship itself.
Implications
Frequently, measuring instruments are used in the psychological literature as though they
make no assumptions about the subjects being rated (Richardson, 2005; Williams, 2005), as
though they are “mapping the reality” of whatever they are purported to “measure.” Having
demonstrated the weakly relational assumptions inherent in the instruments herein analyzed, it is
important to point out that these instruments are not “objective” instruments of measurement, at
least in the conventional sense. Instead, they make clear – though implicit – assumptions about
what constitutes a quality marriage and what couples are like, and thus are biased accordingly.
These instruments have a specific interpretive framework that is inescapable in any meaningmaking of the results obtained through the use of these measures.
This interpretive framework places limitations on how marriages are understood and
evaluated. The instruments are only capable of measuring relationships from a weakly relational
perspective, and are therefore unable to measure relationships from alternative viewpoints, such
as a strongly relational perspective. In other words, even if researchers themselves assume that
persons are fundamentally and strongly relational, using these measures will not allow
researchers to measure the properties associated with this type of relationality. Instead, they will
be restricted to understanding relationships as individualistic endeavors. Evaluations of marriage
will focus almost exclusively on measuring the individuals and their perceptions of marriage, not
on measuring the marriage itself in a strongly relational sense. More importantly, married
individuals are restricted in how they can represent themselves. Even if married individuals
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wished to represent themselves as other-interested or interested in a shared good, they cannot do
so, limited as they are to measurement items that only permit an atomistic, self-interested
representation.
Perhaps the most important implication of using these measures as they stand is that the
interpretive framework is an individualistic one. Though many are critical of the pervasiveness
of individualism in marriage, outcome measures could be compounding the problems without
researchers even knowing it. Again, this is true even if a researcher or a therapist is personally
opposed to individualism in marriage. No matter the researcher’s or couple’s personal
interpretive framework, the weakly relational interpretive framework of these measures will
insinuate themselves into the research results if the instruments are used. When the measures
deem a marriage good, it is only good by the standards of a weak relationality. That is, it is good
as an atomistic marriage of potentially self-interested individuals.
The same sort of problem could occur when using these measures in therapy. For
instance, if a couple coming out of therapy is tested by any of these measures, their results will
be by the standards of weak relationality. A “good” marriage, in this sense, would be a marriage
imbued with individualism, perhaps even considering the marriage as a means to individual ends.
If this kind of individualism is problematic, as many scholars have surmised, then this “good” is
not really good. In this way, therapists and researchers may be misled by the measures’
interpretive framework, compounding the very problems that individualism poses for marital
sciences. Even the popular marriage literature will be subject to this individualistic framework if
it is informed by research results obtained using these measures.
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One final implication of the results is that they might lend insight into the scientistpractitioner divide. Practitioners often feel frustrated at the seeming disconnect between what
they feel is good practice, based on their experience, and what their scientific peers claim is good
practice (e.g., Adams & Miller, 2008). On the one hand, scientists recommend the use of
instruments such as I analyzed in demonstrating the efficacy of practice. But as the results show,
couples are often abstracted from their every day context through the use of these marital
outcome instruments. Practitioners, on the other hand, deal with couples on a very contextual
level – that is, they deal with couples personally and locally, and are thus better able to see the
couple in context. In short, practitioners – just by nature of what they do – can better see couples
from a strongly relational perspective. The frustration that practitioners might feel in being
expected to draw upon science – for example, by using scientific instruments such as those
analyzed here – might stem from the incongruency that they feel between the weak relationality
in the measures and the potential for strong relationality they experience with their clients.
Future Directions
As I have argued, an alternative interpretive framework is available, one which is rooted
in a relational ontology. One of the most obvious directions for future research is exploring and
applying this alternative in the theory, research, and practice of the marital sciences. As the
measures stand currently, marital quality is defined primarily by individual satisfaction, a rather
thin definition. The relational alternative would require a thicker definition of marital quality,
implying evaluations of marriage and marital therapy that take into account the entirety of the
relational context. This would mean that evaluation needs to consider the contextual envelope of
a couple’s relationship, as well as their extended family, their community, and their culture. The
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measure of a good marriage would be the documentation of a shared good (not one that is selfcontained).
Evaluations from this perspective would be what Taylor (1989) calls strong evaluations,
or evaluations that take the whole of the context into account. The definition of a good marriage
would be deeply contextual, and as a consequence, it could be different from couple to couple.
Simple, universal definitions of the good marriage – such as those used in the measures analyzed
– would only be useful for certain contexts, if that. Given that these definitions might differ from
couple to couple, one might wonder if a strong relational approach to marriage has to be
relativistic. Abstractionists would assume that relativism can only be avoided through universal
principles, so any framework that eschews such principles is always considered suspect.
With strong relationality, however, its deep contextuality is the source of its truth and
thus the reason it does not involve a harmful relativism. Evaluating the good marriage is
inseparable from the context, requiring that community, culture, and history be taken into
account. For example, a Christian couple from this perspective could assume that the Holy Spirit
or the Light of Christ is part of the deep context of their marriage. For this reason, the couple
cannot simply decide what the good marriage is for them (relativism). Instead, evaluating the
goodness of the marriage would need to be informed by the Holy Spirit or the Light of Christ, as
it manifests itself in the context of the couple’s relationship.
Once the marital quality is understood in this deeply contextual way, particularly with
respect to the relational moral framework, then strong evaluations of the marriage could take
place. Couples would need to be evaluated according to whether they lived into their good
marriage. In other words, rather than instrumentally using marriage to serve the couple’s or
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individual’s interests, the couple would be evaluated on whether they engaged responsibly and
morally with the whole of their marital context. Continuing with the example above, if the first
step is to understand how the goodness of the Christian couple’s marriage is informed by the
Holy Spirit, then the next step would be to inquire into how well the couple honor the Holy Spirit
by living according to that goodness.
Strong relationists would not rule out the use of the existing measures, though they would
likely make adaptations. For example, some behaviors measured by both self-report and
behavioral observation might be characteristic of some good marriages. However, the strong
relationist would need to be cautious about allowing the existing measures to define what is good
for every marriage, without allowing for other behaviors (not measured) to also be part of the
measurements. Thus even if strong relationists were to consider using existing measures, they
would always keep in mind the context and thus the limitations that the measures impose on
understanding marriage, and consider whether those limitations can appropriately help to
characterize the goodness of a particular couple’s marriage. It is important to keep in mind that,
even for a particular couple, the good marriage can change from one context to the next.
Consequently, the same behaviors that may have, at one point, characterized the couple’s good
marriage might, in another situation, characterize a bad marriage. The focus for the strong
relationist is above all on the couple and the couple’s moral context, not on any tool or rubric
which one might use to guide evaluation.
Conclusion
Because so many feel individualism is such a problematic assumption for marriage, it is
important to understand how deeply, if at all, this assumption has penetrated the marital sciences.
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The purpose of this project was to determine if and to what extent individualism, under the
ontological framework of abstractionism, is assumed by the marital therapy outcome instruments.
As I have shown, abstractionism, and therefore individualistic assumptions, overwhelmingly
dominates the marital therapy outcome instruments. This means that, as they stand, the
instruments cannot prevent individualistic assumptions from infiltrating outcome results. Indeed,
it is even possible that the instruments are exacerbating the problems of individualism through
their use in research and therapy, even if the researchers and therapists wish to avoid these
problems. If this is true, then therapists and researchers are truly measuring individuals, rather
than measuring relationships.
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